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Abstrat
We investigate the logial foundations of ontrats in distributed ap-
pliations. A ontrat is an agreement stipulated between two or more
parties, whih speies the duties and the rights of the parties involved
therein. We model ontrats as formulae in an intuitionisti logi extended
with a ontratual form of impliation։. This supports for a variant of
Modus Ponens, where from a promise a ։ b to dedue b, one does not
need to know a; yet, it sues to have a dual promise b ։ a. We study
the proof theory for our logi. In partiular, we provide it with a Hilbert-
style axiomatisation, whih is shown onsistent, and with a Gentzen-style
sequent alulus, shown equivalent to the axiomatization. We prove our
logi deidable, via a ut elimination property. The rights and the duties
deriving from any set of ontrats an therefore be mehanially inferred.
1 Introdution
Seurity, trustworthiness and reliability of software systems are ruial issues in
the rising Information Soiety. As new online servies (e-ommere, e-banking,
e-government, et.) are made available, the number and the ritiality of the
problems related to non-funtional properties of servies keeps growing. From
the lient point of view, it is important to be sure that, e.g., after a payment
has been made, then either the payed goods are made available, or a full refund
is issued. From the provider point of view it is important to be sure, e.g., that a
lient will not repudiate a ompleted transation, so to obtain for free the goods
already delivered. In other words, the interation between a lient and a servie
must be regulated by a suitable ontrat, whih guarantees to both parties the
properties on demand. The ruial problem is then how to dene the onept
of ontrat, and how to atually enfore it, in an environment - the Internet -
whih is by denition open and unreliable.
Unfortunately, at the present no widespread tehnology seems to give a gen-
eral solution to this problem. Typially, servies do not provide the lient with
any onrete guarantee about the atual funtionality they implement. At best,
the servie provider ommits himself to respet some servie level agreement.
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In the ase this is not honoured, the only thing the lient an do is to take legal
steps against the provider (or vie versa). Although this is the normal pratie
nowadays, it is highly desirable to reverse this trend. Indeed, both lients and
servies ould inur relevant expenses due to the needed legal disputes. This is
impratial, espeially for transations dealing with small amounts of money.
Contributions. We study the theoretial foundations upon whih onstrut-
ing a servie infrastruture where ontrats arry, besides the usual legal mean-
ing, also a formal one. In other words, our ontrats will be mathematial
entities, that speify exatly the rights and the duties of lients and servies.
We envisage a world of servies where lients and servie providers an have
preise, mathematial guarantees about the implemented features, and about
the assumed side onditions. In the senario we aim at, ontesting a ontrat
will not neessarily require to resort to a ourt, yet it will be an event managed
automatially, deterministially and inexpensively, by the servie infrastruture
itself. We all this interation paradigm ontrat-based omputing.
In this paper we begin our investigation on ontrat-based omputing, by
studying formalisms to desribe ontrats, and to reason about them. A ontrat
is a binding agreement between two or more parties, that ditates the duties
the involved parties must fulll, whenever some preonditions are satised. Our
theory of ontrats will be able to infer, in eah possible ontext, the duties
deriving from a given set of ontrats. To put the developed theory at work, we
have implemented a proof searh tool, whih deides whether a given formula
is a tautology or not [26℄.
Summary. The paper is organized as follows:
• In Setion 2 we give, with the help of an example, some motivations about
the need for a logi for ontrats.
• In Setion 3 we devise a minimal set of properties whih are desirable in
any logial formalization of ontrats.
• In Setion 4 we dene our logi for ontrats, through a Hilbert-style
axiomatization. Our logi satises all the properties identied above as
desirable.
• In Setion 5 we give further details and examples about using our logi to
model a variety of ontrats.
• In Setion 6 we provide our logi with a Gentzen-style sequent alulus,
whih is equivalent to the Hilbert-style axiomatization.
• In Setion 7 we prove the main tehnial result about our logi, that is its
deidability. This is obtained by showing that our sequent alulus enjoys
ut elimination and the subformula property.
• In Setion 8 we study relations with other logis, in partiular with in-
tuitionisti propositional logi IPC, with the modal logi S4, and with
propositional lax logi.
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• In Setion 9 we extend our logi with an indexed modality, to model
prinipals. Contrat agreements then ome in a riher avour, beause
of the binding between the ontrating parties and their inferred duties,
whih is now revealed.
• In Setion 10 we disuss some related work.
• In Setion 11 we onlude, by disussing some possible future work and
extensions to our logi.
2 Motivations
Suppose there are two kids, Alie and Bob, who want to play together. Alie
has a toy airplane, while Bob has a bike. Both Alie and Bob wish to play with
eah other's toy: Alie wants to ride Bob's bike, and Bob wants to play with
Alie's airplane. Alie and Bob are very metiulous kids, so before sharing their
toys, they stipulate the following gentlemen's agreement:
Alie: I will lend my airplane to you, Bob, provided that I borrow your bike.
Bob: I will lend my bike to you, Alie, provided that I borrow your airplane.
We want to make preise the ommitments exhanged by Alie and Bob, so
to be able to formally dedue that Alie and Bob will indeed share their toys,
provided they are real gentlemen who always respet their promises.
Let us write a for the atomi proposition Alie lends her airplane and b for
Bob lends his bike. Using lassial propositional logi, a straightforward  yet
naïve  formalization of the above ommitments ould be the following. Alie's
ommitment A is represented as the formula b→ a (if Bob lends his bike, then
Alie lends her airplane) and Bob's ommitment as the formula a→ b (if Alie
lends her airplane, then Bob lends his bike):
A = b→ a B = a→ b
where the symbol → denotes lassial impliation. Under the hypothesis that
Alie and Bob always respet their promises, both formulas A and B are sound
with respet to our senario. For the formula A, it is true that whenever b holds
(Bob lends his bike), then a will also hold (Alie lends her airplane). For the
formula B, it is true that whenever a holds (Alie lends her airplane), then b
will also hold (Bob lends his bike).
So, why are we unhappy with the above formalization? The problem is
that, in lassial propositional logi, the above ommitments are not enough to
dedue that Alie will lend her airplane and Bob will lend his bike. Formally, it
is possible to make true the formula A∧B by assigning false to both propositions
a and b. So, Alie and Bob will not be able to play together, despite of their
gentlemen's agreement, and of the hypothesis that they always respet promises.
The failure to represent senarios like the one above seems related to the
standard interpretation of the Modus Ponens. In both lassial and intuition-
isti proof theories, the Modus Ponens rule allows to dedue b whenever a→ b
and a are true. Bak to our senario, we ould dedue that Bob lends his bike,
but only after Alie has lent Bob her airplane. One of the two parties must
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take the rst step in order to make the agreement beome eetive, that is to
imply the promised duties. In a logi for mutual agreements, we would like 
instead  to make an agreement beome eetive also without the need of some
party taking the rst step (as we shall see in a while, suh party might not even
exists in more omplex senarios). That is, A and B are ontrats, that one
stipulated imply the duties promised by all the involved parties.
Tehnially, we would like our logi able to dedue a ∧ b whenever A ∧ B
is true. As we have notied above, this does not hold neither in lassial nor
in intuitionisti propositional logi, where the behaviour of impliation stritly
adheres to Modus Ponens.
To model ontrats, we extend the intuitionisti propositional logi IPC [30℄
with a new form of impliation, that we denote with the symbol ։. The re-
sulting logi is alled PCL, for Propositional Contrat Logi. For instane, the
ontrat delared by Alie, I will lend my airplane to Bob provided that Bob
lends his bike to me, will be written b։ a. This form of, say, ontratual im-
pliation, is stronger than the standard impliation → of IPC. Atually, b։ a
implies a not only when b is true, like IPC impliation, but also in the ase
that a ompatible ontrat, e.g. a ։ b, holds. In our senario, this means
that Alie will lend her airplane to Bob, provided that Bob agrees to lend his
bike to Alie whenever he borrows Alie's airplane, and vie versa. Atually,
the following formula is a theorem of our logi:
(b։ a) ∧ (a։ b) → a ∧ b
In other words, from the gentlemen's agreement stipulated by Alie and Bob,
we an dedue that the two kids will indeed share their toys.
To make our senario a bit more interesting, suppose now that a third kid,
Carl, joins Alie and Bob. Carl has a omi book, whih he would share with
Alie and Bob, provided that he an play with the other kids' toys. To a-
ommodate their ommitments to the new senario, the three kids deide to
stipulate the following gentlemen's agreement (whih supersedes the old one):
Alie: I will share my airplane, provided that I an play with Bob's bike and
read Carl's omi book.
Bob: I will share my bike, provided that I an play with Alie's airplane and
read Carl's omi book.
Carl: I will share my omi book, provided that I an play with Alie's airplane
and ride Bob's bike.
Let us write a for Alie shares her airplane, b for Bob shares his bike,
and c for Carl shares his omi book. Then, the above ommitments an be
rephrased as: Alie promises a provided that b and c, Bob promises b provided
that a and c, and Carl promises c provided that a and b. In our ontrat logi,
we model the above agreement as the formula A ∧B ∧C, where:
A = (b ∧ c)։ a B = (a ∧ c)։ b C = (a ∧ b)։ c
The proof system of our logi will be able to dedue that the three kids will
indeed share their toys, that is, the following is theorem of the logi:
A ∧B ∧C → a ∧ b ∧ c
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It it interesting to ompare the speiation above, whih uses ontratual im-
pliation, with a speiation whih uses, instead, standard impliation. Let:
A′ = (b ∧ c)→ a B′ = (a ∧ c)→ b C′ = (a ∧ b)→ c
Clearly, in this ase we annot dedue A′ ∧ B′ ∧ C′ → a ∧ b ∧ c. This senario
provide us with a further insight about ontratual impliation. Reonsider for a
moment the senario with only two ontrating parties, modelled with standard
impliation: (a→ b)∧ (b→ a). We have shown above that, in suh a situation,
a single party an make the agreement eetive, e.g. Alie an take the rst step,
and lend her airplane to Bob (then, by Modus Ponens, Bob will lend his bike to
Alie). Instead, in the extended senario (modelled with standard impliation),
it is no longer the ase that a single party an take the rst step and ahieve
the same goal. For instane, assume that Alie deides unilaterally to share her
airplane. Even by doing that, Alie will have no guarantee that, eventually, she
will be able to play with the other kids' toys. This is beause, with standard
impliation, setting a to true would transform A′∧B′∧C′ into (c→ b)∧(b→ c),
whih learly implies neither b nor c. To make their agreement eetive, at least
two of the three parties must use ontratual impliation in their ommitments
(while the other one an use standard impliation).
This observation an be generalised to a senario with n ontrating parties,
where one an show that at least n−1 parties must use ontratual impliation.
3 Desirable properties
We now disuss some desirable properties of a logi for ontrats, as well as some
other properties that  instead  are undesirable. In the next setion, we will
show an axiomatisation that enjoys all the properties marked here as desired.
As shown in the previous setion, a haraterizing property of ontratual
impliation is that of allowing two ontrating parties to handshake, so to
make their agreement eetive. This is resumed by the following handshaking
property, whih we expet to hold for any logi for ontrats:
(p։ q) ∧ (q ։ p) → p ∧ q (1)
A generalisation of the above property to the ase of n ontrating parties is
also desirable. It is a sort of irular handshaking, where the (i+ 1)-th party,
in order to promise some duty pi+1, relies on a promise pi made by the i-th
party. In the ase of n parties, we would expet the following:
(p1 ։ p2) ∧ · · · ∧ (pn−1 ։ pn) ∧ (pn ։ p1) → p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pn (2)
As a onrete example, onsider an e-ommere senario where a Buyer an
buy items from a Seller, and pay them through a redit ard. To mediate the
interation between the Buyer and the Seller, there is a Bank whih manages
payments. The ontrats issued by the three parties ould then be:
Buyer: I will lik pay provided that the Seller will ship my item
Seller: I will ship your item provided that I get the money
Bank: I will transfer money to the Seller provided that the Buyer liks pay.
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Let the atomi propositions ship, clickpay, and pay denote respetively the
fats Seller ships item, Buyer liks pay, and Bank transfers money. Then,
the three ontrats above an be modelled as follows:
Buyer = ship։ clickpay Bank = clickpay։ pay Seller = pay։ ship
Then, by the handshaking property (2), we obtain a suessful transation:
Buyer ∧ Bank ∧ Seller → pay ∧ ship
Note that, in the speial ase that n equals 1, the above irular handshak-
ing property turns into a partiularly simple form:
(p։ p) → p (3)
Intuitively, (3) an be interpreted as the fat that promising p provided that p,
implies p (atually, also the onverse holds, so that promise is equivalent to p).
A generalisation of the senario of the previous setion to the ase of n kids
is also desirable. It is a sort of greedy handshaking property, beause now a
party promises pi only provided that all the other parties promise their duties,
i.e. p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pn. The greedy handshaking an then be stated as:∧
i∈1..n
(
(p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pi−1 ∧ pi+1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn)։ pi
)
→ p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pn (4)
As shown by (1), a ontrat p ։ q beomes eetive, i.e. implies the
promise q, when it is mathed by a dual ontrat q ։ p. Even more diretly,
p։ q should be eetive also in the ase that the premise p is already true:
p ∧ (p։ q) → q (5)
In other words, ontratual impliation should be stronger than standard impli-
ation, i.e. we expet that the following is a theorem of any logi for ontrats:
(p։ q)→ (p→ q) (6)
On the other hand, we do not want that also the onverse holds, sine this
would equate the two forms of impliation:
(p→ q)→ (p։ q) NOT A TAUTOLOGY
We want ontratual impliation to share with standard impliation a num-
ber properties. We disuss some of them below. First, a ontrat that promises
true (written ⊤) is always satised, regardless of the preondition. Then, we
expet the following tautology:
p։ ⊤ (7)
However, dierently from standard impliation, we do not want that a on-
trat with a false preondition (written ⊥) always holds.
⊥։ p NOT A TAUTOLOGY
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So see why, assume that we have ⊥։ p as a tautology, for all p. Then, it would
also be the ase for p = ⊥, and so by the binary handshaking property we would
dedue a ontradition: (⊥։ ⊥) ∧ (⊥։ ⊥)→ ⊥.
Another property of impliation that we want to preserve is transitivity:
(p։ q) ∧ (q ։ r) → (p։ r) (8)
Bak to our previous example, transitivity would allow the promise of the
Buyer (ship ։ clickpay) and the promise of the Bank (clickpay ։ pay) to be
ombined in the promise ship։ pay.
Contratual impliation should also enjoy a stronger form of transitivity. We
illustrate it with the help of an example. Suppose an air-ight ustomer wants
to book a ight. To do that, he issues the following ontrat:
Customer : bookFlight։ pay
The ontrat states that the ustomer promises to pay the required amount,
provided that he obtains a ight reservation. Suppose now that an airline om-
pany starts a speial oer, in the form of a free drink for eah ustomer that
makes a reservation:
AirLine : pay։ bookFlight∧ freeDrink
Of ourse, the two ontrats should give rise to an agreement, beause the airline
ompany is promising a better servie than the one required be the ustomer
ontrat. To ahieve that, we expet to be able to weaken the ontrat of the
airline ompany, to make it math the ontrat issued by the ustomer:
AirLine → (pay։ bookFlight)
Alternatively, one ould make the two ontrats math by making stronger
the preondition required by the ustomer, that is:
Customer → (bookFlight ∧ freeDrink։ pay)
More in general, we want the following two properties hold for any logi for
ontrats. They say that the promise in a ontrat an be arbitrarily weak-
ened (9), while the preondition an be arbitrarily strengthened (10).
(p։ q) ∧ (q → q′) → (p։ q′) (9)
(p′ → p) ∧ (p։ q) → (p′ ։ q) (10)
Note that the properties (8), (9) and (10) over three of the four possible
ases of transitivity properties whih mix standard and ontratual impliation.
Observe, instead, that ombining two impliations into a ontrat is not a de-
sirable property of any logi for ontrats, for the same reason for whih we do
not want standard and ontratual impliations be equivalent.
(p→ q) ∧ (q → r) → (p։ r) NOT A TAUTOLOGY
Another property that should hold is that, if a promise q is already true,
then it is also true any ontrat whih promises q:
q → (p։ q) (11)
Of ourse, we do not want the onverse to hold: it is not always the ase
that a ontrat implies its promise.
(p։ q)→ q NOT A TAUTOLOGY
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4 A Logi for Contrats
In this setion we give the basi ingredients of our logi for ontrats PCL.
In Set. 4.1 we present the syntax of PCL; in Set. 4.2 we provide it with an
Hilbert-style axiomatization. Finally, in Set. 4.3 we study some interesting
properties of PCL that follow from the given axioms.
4.1 Syntax
The syntax of PCL is a simple extension of IPC. It inludes the standard logi
onnetives ¬,∧,∨,→ and the ontratual impliation onnetive ։. We as-
sume a denumerable set {p, q, r, s, . . .} of prime (atomi) formulae. Arbitrary
PCL formulae are denoted with the letters p, q, r, s, . . . (note that the font dif-
fers from that used for prime formulae). The preedene of IPC operators is
the following, from highest to lowest: ¬,∧,∨,→. We stipulate that ։ has the
same preedene as →.
Denition 4.1. The formulae of PCL are indutively dened by the following
grammar.
p ::= ⊥ false
| ⊤ true
| p prime
| ¬p negation
| p ∨ p disjuntion
| p ∧ p onjuntion
| p→ p impliation
| p։ p ontratual impliation
We let p ↔ q be syntati sugar for (p → q) ∧ (q → p). If a formula is ։-free,
we say it is an IPC formula. We use the symbol =⇒ to denote impliation in
the meta-theory, so to avoid onfusion with →.
4.2 Proof Theory: Hilbert-style Axiomatization
We now dene a Hilbert-style proof system for PCL. The axioms inlude all the
standard axioms for IPC (see e.g. [24℄). Like in IPC, we have a single inferene
rule, i.e. Modus Ponens. The haraterising axioms for PCL are alled Zero, Fix
and PrePost.
Denition 4.2. The axioms of PCL are presented below.
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• Core IPC axioms.
p ∧ q → p ∧1
p ∧ q → q ∧2
p→ q → p ∧ q ∧3
p→ p ∨ q ∨1
q → p ∨ q ∨2
(p→ r)→ (q → r)→ (p ∨ q)→ r ∨3
p→ q → p → 1
(p→ q → r)→ (p→ q)→ p→ r → 2
⊥ → p ⊥
⊤ ⊤
¬p→ p→ q ¬1
(p→ q)→ (p→ ¬q)→ ¬p ¬2
• Contratual impliation axioms.
⊤։ ⊤ Zero
(p։ p)→ p Fix
(p′ → p)→ (p։ q)→ (q → q′)→ (p′ ։ q′) PrePost
• Modus ponens (ut).
p p→ q
q
Cut
We write ⊢ p when p is derivable from the axioms and inferene rules above.
The ontratual impliation axioms are atually speial ases of the desired
properties of ontrats seen in Set. 3. For instane, the axiom Zero is a speial
ase of (7). The axiom Fix is exatly the property (3). The axiom PrePost plays
the role of both the properties (10) and (9).
4.3 Fundamental Consequenes
We present below some signiant onsequenes of the axioms in Def. 4.2. Note
that these onsequenes over all the properties marked in Set. 3 as desirable.
To shorten our notation, when speaking about non-provability, we write 6⊢ p
when the formula p is not a theorem of PCL (i.e. p is not true for all the
instantiations of the metavariables). For instane, we write6⊢ p→ p∧ q to mean
that ¬∀p, q. ⊢ p→ p ∧ q.
Lemma 4.3. Contratual impliation is stritly stronger than impliation.
⊢ (p։ q)→ (p→ q) (12)
6⊢ (p→ q)→ (p։ q) (13)
Proof. For (12), assume that p ։ q and p hold. Hene, q → p trivially holds.
By using PrePost on q → p,p։ q, and q → q, we get q ։ q. We then onlude q
by Fix. We antiipate in (13) a negative result that an be mehanially veried
using the deision proedure of Lemma 6.14.
Below, we establish some further onnetions between ։ and →, whih
generalize the transitivity of ։.
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Lemma 4.4. Contratual impliation is transitive. More in detail, we have the
following interations between ։ and →.
⊢ (p։ q)→ (q ։ r)→ (p։ r) (14)
⊢ (p→ q)→ (q ։ r)→ (p։ r) (15)
⊢ (p։ q)→ (q → r)→ (p։ r) (16)
6⊢ (p→ q)→ (q → r)→ (p։ r) (17)
Proof. Properties (15,16) are diret onsequenes of PrePost, and the trivial
r → r and p→ p.
For (14), we apply Lemma 4.3(12) to p ։ q, so obtaining p → q. Then we
an apply (15) to onlude.
We antiipate in (17) a negative result that an be mehanially veried
using the deision proedure of Lemma 6.14.
The distributivity laws of ։ are quite peuliar. As for standard implia-
tion in IPC, ∨-distributivity holds in only one diretion (18,19). Instead, while
∧-distributivity holds in both diretions in IPC for standard impliation, on-
tratual impliation only satises one diretion (20,21). However, a related
property holds (22).
Lemma 4.5. Distributivity laws.
⊢ (p։ q) ∨ (p։ r)→ (p։ (q ∨ r)) (18)
6⊢ (p։ (q ∨ r))→ (p։ q) ∨ (p։ r) (19)
⊢ (p։ (q ∧ r))→ (p։ q) ∧ (p։ r) (20)
6⊢ (p։ q) ∧ (p։ r)→ (p։ (q ∧ r)) (21)
⊢ (p։ q) ∧ (q ։ r)→ (p։ (q ∧ r)) (22)
Proof. For (18), assume (p։ q)∨ (p։ r). If p։ q holds, we apply PrePost to
weaken q to q ∨ r. The p։ r ase is similar.
For (20), assume p ։ (q ∧ r). By PrePost, it is then easy to obtain both
p։ q and p։ r.
We antiipate in (19,21) some negative results that an be mehanially
veried using the deision proedure of Lemma 6.14.
For (22), assume the hypotheses. We apply Lemma 4.3 to q ։ r and obtain
q → r, hene q → (q ∧ r). By PrePost on p։ q, we obtain the thesis.
Lemma 4.6. Substitution of equivalent formulae.
⊢ (p↔ p′)→ (q ↔ q′)→ (p։ q)→ (p′ ։ q′)
Proof. Apply PrePost to p′ → p, p։ q, and q → q′.
The following lemma states a suient ondition and a neessary ondition
for p ։ q to hold. These onditions are expressed in IPC, i.e. they make no
use of ։. We will return on these in Def. 8.6, 8.8 and related results, where we
will prove that, when p, q are IPC formulae, these onditions are atually the
weakest suient ondition and the strongest neessary ondition that an be
expressed within IPC (Lemma 8.10).
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Lemma 4.7. Contratual impliation admits the following suient ondition
and neessary ondition.
⊢ q → (p։ q) (23)
⊢ (p։ q)→ ((q → p)→ q) (24)
Proof. For (23), assume q. We onlude by PrePost on p→ ⊤ (trivial), ⊤։ ⊤
(by Zero), ⊤ → q (by q).
For (24), assume p ։ q and q → p. By PrePost, we have q ։ q, so we
onlude by Fix.
The following lemma justies our hoie of IPC, rather than lassial logi
CPC, as the basis for our logi: indeed, hoosing CPC would make our ontra-
tual impliation muh less interesting.
Lemma 4.8. Denote with ⊢C p the provability of p in the system of Def. 4.2
augmented with the axiom of exluded middle (p ∨ ¬p). Then, we have:
⊢C (p։ q)↔ q
Proof. Diret onsequene of Lemma 4.7, sine ((q → p)→ q)→ q is a tautology
of CPC (atually, it is the well-known Peire's law).
The following two lemmata are about handshaking of n ontrating parties.
Lemma 4.9 speaks about irular handshaking where the i-th party relies on
the promise made by the i − 1-th party, as in (2). Lemma 4.10 is a stronger
version of this, beause it allows eah party to rely on the promises made by all
the other parties, as in (4).
Lemma 4.9. (Handshaking) For all n ≥ 0 and for all p0, . . . , pn:
⊢ (p0 ։ p1)→ · · · → (pn−1 ։ pn)→ (pn ։ p0)→ (p0 ∧ . . . ∧ pn)
Proof. Assume all the hypotheses. By repeated appliation of Lemma 4.4, we
have pi ։ pi for all i ∈ 0..n. We then onlude by Fix.
Lemma 4.10. (Greedy handshaking) For all n ≥ 0, for all p0, . . . , pn, and
for all i, j ∈ 0..n:
⊢
∧
i
((∧
j 6=i
pj
)
։ pi
)
→
∧
i
pi (25)
Proof. By indution on n. The base ase n = 0 is simple: (⊤ ։ p0) → p0 is
proved by applying PrePost to ⊤։ p0, hene obtaining p0 ։ p0 and onluding
by Fix.
In the indutive ase, assume that (25) holds for n − 1. We then prove it
for n. To do that, we assume that the hypothesis
(∧
j 6=i pj
)
։ pi is true for
eah i = 0..n, and then we proeed to prove the thesis
∧
i pi. First, we prove
the following auxiliary result:
pn →
∧
j 6=n
pj (26)
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To prove (26), assume pn. Then, we have
(∧
j 6=i pj
)
↔
(∧
j 6=i,j 6=n pj
)
, so
by Lemma 4.6 we get
(∧
j 6=i,j 6=n pj
)
։ pi for i = 0..n − 1. We an apply the
indutive hypothesis (25), and have
∧
j 6=n pj .
Bak to the indutive ase, note that sine i an be n, we have
(∧
j 6=n pj
)
։
pn. We then onlude by (26,24).
5 Examples
Example 5.1. The toy exhange senario from Set. 2 is modelled as:
⊢ (airplane։ bike) ∧ (bike։ airplane)→ (airplane ∧ bike)
Indeed, this is a onsequene of our axioms, and a speial ase of Lemma 4.9.
Example 5.2. We now exploit our logi to model a typial preliminary ontrat
for a real estate sale in Italy.
Assume a buyer who is interested in buying a new house from a given seller.
Before stipulating the atual purhase ontrat, the buyer and the seller meet
to stipulate a preliminary sale ontrat, that xes the terms and onditions of
the purhase. Typially, this ontrat will indiate the prie and the date when
the deed of sale will take plae, and it will outline the obligations for the buyer
and the seller. When the preliminary ontrat is signed by both parties, the
buyer will typially pay a part of the sale prie. By the italian laws, if the
seller deides not to sell the house after having signed the preliminary ontrat
and olleted the deposit, she must pay the buyer bak twie the sum reeived.
Similarly, if the buyer hanges his mind and deides not to buy the house, he
loses the whole deposited amount.
We model the preliminary sale ontrat as two PCL formulae, one for the
buyer and the other for the seller. The buyer will sign the preliminary ontrat
(signB), provided that the seller will atually sell her house (sellS), or she refunds
twie the sum reeived (refundS). Also, the buyer promises that if he signs the
preliminary ontrat, than either he will pay the stipulated prie (payB), or he
will not pay and lose the deposit (refundB)
Buyer : ((sellS ∨ refundS)։ signB) ∧ (signB։ (payB ∨ (¬payB ∧ refundB)))
The seller promises that she will sign the preliminary ontrat (signS), pro-
vided that either the buyer promises to pay the stipulated amount, or he
promises to lose the deposit. Also, the seller promises that is she signs the
preliminary ontrat, then she will either sell her house, or will not sell and
refund twie the sum reeived.
Seller : ((payB ∨ refundB)։ signS) ∧ (signS։ (sellS ∨ (¬sellS ∧ refundS)))
A rst onsequene is that the two ontrats lead to an agreement between
the buyer and the seller, that is both parties will sign the preliminary ontrat:
Buyer ∧ Seller → signB ∧ signS (27)
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As a seond onsequene, if one of the parties does not nalize the nal deed
of sale, than that party will refund the other:
Buyer ∧ Seller ∧ ¬payB → refundB (28)
Buyer ∧ Seller ∧ ¬sellS → refundS (29)
To prove the above, we proeed as follows. First, we apply transitivity (14)
to Buyer and Seller:
(sellS ∨ refundS)։ (payB ∨ (¬payB ∧ refundB))
(payB ∨ refundB)։ (sellS ∨ (¬sellS ∧ refundS))
Then, we use PrePost:
(sellS ∨ (¬sellS ∧ refundS))։ (payB ∨ (¬payB ∧ refundB))
(payB ∨ (¬payB ∧ refundB))։ (sellS ∨ (¬sellS ∧ refundS))
So, by Lemma 4.9, we have that Buyer ∧ Seller implies
(sellS ∨ (¬sellS ∧ refundS)) ∧ (payB ∨ (¬payB ∧ refundB))
By (12) the above and Buyer∧Seller imply signB∧ signS. This proves (27).
Also, the above and ¬payB learly imply refundB. The same holds for sellS and
refundS. Hene, we establish (28,29).
Example 5.3. We now desribe a possible online sale between two parties. In
order to buy an item, rst the buyer has to ontat the bank and reserve from
his aount a spei amount of money for the transation. When this happens,
that amount is no longer available for anything else. We model this reservation
with the formula lock. Then, the buyer has to make an oer to the seller: this
is modelled with offer. The seller, when provided with an oer, evaluates it.
If she thinks the oer is good, and the money has been reserved, then she will
send the item (send). Otherwise, she anels the transation (abort). When
the transation is aborted, the bank anels the money reservation, so that the
buyer an use the amount for other transations (unlock).
We now formalize the senario. The buyer agrees to lock ∧ offer, provided
that either the item is sent, or the money reservation is anelled. The seller
agrees to evaluate the oer. The bank agrees to anel the reservation when the
transation is aborted.
Buyer : (send ∨ unlock)։ (lock ∧ offer)
Seller : offer։ ((lock→ send) ∨ abort)
Bank : (lock ∧ abort)։ unlock
Under these assumptions, we an see that either the item is sent, or the
transation is aborted and the reservation anelled.
⊢ (Buyer ∧ Seller ∧Bank)→ (send ∨ (abort ∧ unlock))
To prove this, rst we apply PrePost to Seller and obtain (lock ∧ offer) ։
((lock→ send)∨abort). By property (22) and Buyer, we have (send∨unlock)։
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(lock ∧ offer ∧ ((lock → send) ∨ abort)). By PrePost, we weaken it, obtaining
(send ∨ unblock) ։ (send ∨ (lock ∧ abort)). By Bank and 4.3, we have (lock ∧
abort) → unlock, as well as (lock ∧ abort) → (abort ∧ unlock). Therefore, by
PrePost we have (send ∨ unlock) ։ (send ∨ (abort ∧ unlock)). We onlude by
PrePost and Fix.
Example 5.4. (Dining retailers) Around a round table, a group of n utlery
retailers is about to have dinner. In the enter of the table, there is a large dish
of food. Despite the food being deliious, the retailers annot start eating right
now. To do that, and follow the proper etiquette, eah retailer needs to have
a omplete utlery set, onsisting of n piees, eah of a dierent kind. Eah
one of the n retailers owns a distint set of n piee of utlery, all of the same
kind. The retailers start disussing about trading their utlery, so that they an
nally eat. Sine everyone wants to get a fair deal, they want to formalize their
ommittments.
We formalize the senario as follows. Number the retailers r1, . . . , rn together
with the kinds of piees of utlery, so that ri initially owns n piees of kind
number i. Then, write gi,j for ri gives a piee (of kind i) to rj. Sine retailers
an use their own utlery, we assume gi,i to be true. Retailer ri an start eating
whenever ei =
∧
j gj,i .
Suppose that r1 ommits to a simple exhange with r2: they ommit to
g2,1 ։ g1,2 and g1,2 ։ g2,1, and the exhange takes plae sine g2,1 ∧ g1,2 an
be derived. While this seems a fair deal, it atually exposes r1 to a risk: if
r3, . . . , rn perform a similar exhange with r2, then we have g2,i ∧ gi,2 for all
i. In partiular, gi,2 holds for all i, so r2 an start eating. This is however not
neessarily the ase for r1, sine r3 has not ommitted to any exhange with r1.
A wise retailer would then never agree to a simple exhange g2,1 ։ g1,2.
Instead, the retailer r1 ould ommit to a safer ontrat
1
:
g1,1 ∧ g2,1 ∧ · · · ∧ gn,1 ։ g1,1 ∧ g1,2 ∧ · · · ∧ g1,n
The idea is simple: r1 requires eah piee of utlery, that is, r1 requires to
be able to start eating (e1). When this happens, r1 agrees to provide eah other
retailer with a piee of his utlery. Now, assume eh retailer ri ommits to the
analogous ontrat:
ci = ei ։
∧
j
gi,j
We an now verify that
∧
i ci →
∧
i ei, that is, the above ontrats atually
allow everyone to eat. Assume ci for all i, and dene pi =
∧
j gi,j . Clearly,
ci = ei ։ pi. Note that∧
j 6=i
pj =
∧
j 6=i
∧
k
gj,k →
∧
j
gj,i = ei (30)
sine we an hoose k = i and gi,i is true. Therefore, by PrePost,
ci = ei ։ pi →
(∧
j 6=i
pj
)
։ pi
By Lemma 4.10, sine
∧
i ci, we have
∧
i pi. By (30) we then onlude
∧
i ei.
1
We inlude g1,1 = ⊤ to make it more homogeneous.
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Example 5.5. In Set. 3 we listed several requirements for the notion of on-
tratual impliation. A small set of these was then piked as our axiomatization:
Zero, Fixand PrePost. However, we have not yet heked that this is indeed om-
plete with respet to the other requirements. That is, we have to hek that
all the requirements are theorems of PCL. We now quikly reall the list of all
these requirements and provide a support for eah one.
The handshaking properties (1,2) have been established in Lemma 4.9. Prop-
erty (3) is the axiom Fix. The greedy handshaking (4) was established in
Lemma 4.10. Property (6) was proved in Lemma 4.3. Property (7) is a diret
onsequene of Zero. Property (8) is proved in Lemma 4.4. Properties (9,10)
are diret onsequenes of PrePost. Property (11) is a onsequene of axioms
Zero and PrePost.
6 Proof Theory: Sequent Calulus
In this setion we provide an alternative formalization of PCL, through a sequent
alulus à la Gentzen. Our sequents have the form Γ ⊢ p, where Γ is a nite set
of formulae. Below, we write Γ, p for Γ ∪ {p}.
Most of the rules for the IPC fragment have been taken from [27℄, whih fea-
tures a rule set for IPC without strutural rules. This fat turns out to be quite
useful when reasoning about the rule system. Indeed, as in [27℄, we are able to
establish ut-elimination by applying a reasonably simple strutural indution;
we refer to Set. 7 for the detailed proof. In the IPC fragment of our rule system
below, only rules ¬R and weakR diverge from [27℄. This hange was required
to establish the subformula property (Lemma 6.13). Another minor dierene
from [27℄ arises from our Γ's being sets rather than multisets; this is however
immaterial, beause of the absene of strutural rules, and the admissibility of
ontration in [27℄.
Denition 6.1. The Gentzen-style rule system for PCL omprises the following
rules.
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IPC ore rules
Γ, p ⊢ p
id
Γ, p ∧ q, p ⊢ r
Γ, p ∧ q ⊢ r
∧ L1
Γ, p ∧ q, q ⊢ r
Γ, p ∧ q ⊢ r
∧ L2
Γ ⊢ p Γ ⊢ q
Γ ⊢ p ∧ q
∧R
Γ, p ∨ q, p ⊢ r Γ, p ∨ q, q ⊢ r
Γ, p ∨ q ⊢ r
∨ L
Γ ⊢ p
Γ ⊢ p ∨ q
∨R1
Γ ⊢ q
Γ ⊢ p ∨ q
∨R2
Γ, p→ q ⊢ p Γ, p→ q, q ⊢ r
Γ, p→ q ⊢ r
→ L
Γ, p ⊢ q
Γ ⊢ p→ q
→ R
Γ,¬p ⊢ p
Γ,¬p ⊢ r
¬L
Γ, p ⊢ ⊥
Γ ⊢ ¬p
¬R
Γ,⊥ ⊢ p
⊥L
Γ ⊢ ⊤
⊤R
Γ ⊢ ⊥
Γ ⊢ p
weakR
Γ ⊢ p Γ, p ⊢ q
Γ ⊢ q
cut
Contratual impliation rules
Γ ⊢ q
Γ ⊢ p։ q
Zero
Γ, p։ q, r ⊢ p Γ, p։ q, q ⊢ r
Γ, p։ q ⊢ r
Fix
Γ, p։ q, a ⊢ p Γ, p։ q, q ⊢ b
Γ, p։ q ⊢ a։ b
PrePost
Note that IPC rules have left and right rules for eah IPC onnetive.
Roughly, eah onnetive has right rules for introdution, and left rules for
elimination. Contratual impliation instead has a dierent avor. Rule Zero is
eetively an introdution rule, and has a similar funtion to the Hilbert axiom
Zero. Similarly, rule Fix is an elimination rule; its funtion is related to the
Hilbert axiom Fix. Indeed, these rules ould be named ։ R and ։ L, respe-
tively. The left/right rule dualism however is broken by rule PrePost. Of ourse,
its funtion is that of the Hilbert axiom PrePost. This rule behaves both as an
introdution and an elimination, so is both a right and left rule, in a sense.
In the rest of this setion we study the sequent rule system above. First,
we prove it equivalent to our Hilbert axioms (Th. 6.4). Then we prove the
redundany of the weakR rule, i.e. that weakR is admissible in the proof sys-
tem omposed of all the other rules. More importantly, we also prove the cut
rule redundant, i.e. we prove ut-elimination for our sequent rule system. As a
onsequene of ut-elimination, we are able to establish the onsisteny of the
logi (Th. 6.11), the subformula property (Lemma 6.13), and the deidability
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of ⊢(Lemma 6.14). We also prove that the rules Zero,PrePost,Fix are not re-
dundant, as one might expet (Lemma 6.15). Finally we prove that PCL is a
onservative extension of IPC (Lemma 6.16).
6.1 Equivalene of the Hilbert and Gentzen Systems
In this setion, we establish the equivalene between the two dierent logial
systems we introdued. We denote with ⊢H p the fat that p is provable from
the Hilbert-style axioms of Def. 4.2. Similarly, by ⊢G p we denote that ∅ ⊢ p
is a derivable sequent from the Gentzen-style rules of Def. 6.1. We will then
prove ⊢H=⊢G .
Lemma 6.2. ⊢H p =⇒ ⊢G p
Proof. It is suient to show that ⊢G holds for all the Hilbert-style axioms, and
that it is losed under modus ponens. The latter is trivially done by cut and
→ R. For the former, we hek the ։-related axioms, only, sine the others are
standard.
• Zero
⊢ ⊤
⊤R
⊢ ⊤։ ⊤
Zero
• PrePost
∆, p′ ⊢ p′
id
∆, p′, p ⊢ p
id
∆, p′ ⊢ p
→ L
∆, q ⊢ q′
id
∆, q, q′ ⊢ q′
id
∆, q ⊢ q′
→ L
∆ = p′ → p, p։ q, q → q′ ⊢ p′ ։ q′
PrePost
p′ → p, p։ q ⊢ (q → q′)→ (p′ ։ q′)
→ R
p′ → p ⊢ (p։ q)→ (q → q′)→ (p′ ։ q′)
→ R
⊢ (p′ → p)→ (p։ q)→ (q → q′)→ (p′ ։ q′)
→ R
• Fix
p։ p, p ⊢ p
id
p։ p, p ⊢ p
id
p։ p ⊢ p
Fix
⊢ (p։ p)→ p
→ R
Lemma 6.3. ⊢G p =⇒ ⊢H p
Proof. It is suient to prove the following statement for eah rule:
Γ0 ⊢G p0 · · · Γn ⊢G pn
Γ ⊢G p
=⇒ ⊢H
∧
i [
∧
Γi → pi]→
∧
Γ→ p
Then, the lemma follows by indution on the derivation of ⊢G p. Most ases
are standard, so we hek only the ։-related rules.
• Rule Zero: (
∧
Γ→ q)→
∧
Γ→ (p։ q).
Assume the hypotheses. By modus ponens, we get q, hene ⊤ → q. We
have ⊤։ ⊤ by Zero. The formula p→ ⊤ trivially holds. We then apply
PrePost to reah p։ q:
(p→ ⊤)→ (⊤։ ⊤)→ (⊤ → q)→ (p։ q)
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• Rule PrePost:[(
∧
Γ ∧ (p։ q) ∧ a)→ p]∧[(
∧
Γ ∧ (p։ q) ∧ b)→ q]→ (
∧
Γ∧
(p։ q))→ (a։ b).
Assume all the hypotheses. We easily get a → p, p ։ q, q → b. By
PrePost, we get a։ b.
• Rule Fix: [(
∧
Γ ∧ (p։ q) ∧ r)→ p] ∧ [(
∧
Γ ∧ (p։ q) ∧ q)→ r]→ (
∧
Γ ∧
(p։ q))→ r.
Assume all the hypotheses. We get r → p, q → r, hene q → p. Using
q → p (dedued), p ։ q (hypothesis), q → q (trivial), we apply PrePost
and get q ։ q. By Fix, q, hene r.
Theorem 6.4. ⊢G=⊢H
Proof. Immediate from lemmas 6.2 and 6.3.
6.2 Properties of the Gentzen System
A rst basi result of our system is that the left-weakening of a sequent, i.e.
augmenting the Γ, is strongly admissible. That is, whenever we have a derivation
for a sequent, we an produe a derivation for the augmented sequent having
the same height.
Lemma 6.5. If
D
Γ ⊢ p
then
D′
Γ,Γ′ ⊢ p
where D′ has the same height of D.
Proof. It is suient to augment eah sequent in D with Γ′. It is straightforward
to hek that no rule is invalidated by this.
Convention. The above lemma is very frequently used in our proofs. To
avoid ontinuously referring to it, we adopt the following notation: when we
have
D
Γ ⊢ p
, we simply write
D+
Γ,Γ′ ⊢ p
for the augmented derivation.
The next result is dual to Lemma 6.5. It states that the right-weakening of
a sequent, i.e. replaing a ⊥ on the right of the turnstile ⊢ with some other
formula , an be performed without using the weakR rule. In other words, rule
weakR is redundant in our system. To prove this, we rst introdue an auxiliary
lemma.
Lemma 6.6. If
D
Γ ⊢ ⊥
where D is a weakR-free derivation, then we also have
Γ ⊢ p with a weakR-free derivation, for any p.
Proof. By indution on the height of the derivation D. The last step of D must
be one of id, cut,Fix or a left rule. If a left rule or a cut has been used, the thesis
is either trivial (¬L,⊥L) or immediately follows by the indution hypothesis. If
id has been used, then ⊥ ∈ Γ, and ⊥L sues. If Fix has been used, we rewrite
the derivation in the following way:
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D0
Γ, a։ b,⊥ ⊢ a
D1
Γ, a։ b, b ⊢ ⊥
Γ, a։ b ⊢ ⊥
Fix =⇒
Γ, a։ b, p, a ⊢ a
id
D1′′+
Γ, a։ b, p, b ⊢ a
Γ, a։ b, p ⊢ a
Fix
D1′
Γ, a։ b, b ⊢ p
Γ, a։ b ⊢ p
Fix
where D1′ and D1′′ are obtained from the indution hypothesis on D1, and
the formulae p, a respetively.
Note that the transformation above does not introdue new cuts in the
derivation. So, one the ut has been eliminated, the same proedure an elim-
inate weakR, too.
Lemma 6.7. The weakR rule is redundant.
Proof. It is suient to iterate Lemma 6.6.
Another fundamental result enjoyed by our Gentzen-style rules, is the re-
dundany of the cut rule. This is a lassi ut-elimination result, or Haupsatz,
whih is the basis for many of the results in this setion.
Theorem 6.8. (Cut-elimination)The cut rule is redundant.
Proof. See Set. 7 for the detailed proof.
It is possible to remove both the rules cut and weakR from our system without
aeting the generated ⊢ relation.
Theorem 6.9. The rule set {cut,weakR} is redundant.
Proof. This is not an immediate orollary of the previous results, sine removing
a cut from a derivation ould fore us to inlude weakR in the new derivation,
and, vie versa, removing a weakR ould fore us to introdue a cut. However,
by inspeting the proof for Lemma 6.7, we an see that the weakR-elimination
proedure does not introdue new cuts. So, given an arbitrary derivation D for
a sequent, by Th. 6.8 we also have a ut-free derivation D′ for the same sequent.
Then, we an apply the proedure of Lemma 6.7 to onlude.
In our logi, as for IPC, every negation-free theory Γ is onsistent.
Lemma 6.10. Let Γ be free from ¬,⊥. Then Γ 6⊢ ⊥.
Proof. By ontradition, assume
D
Γ ⊢ ⊥
to be a ut-free derivation. We proeed
by indution on the derivation D, and then by ase analysis. The last step of
D an not be id,¬L,⊥L, otherwise Γ is not free from ¬,⊥. If the last step
is another left rule, we have Γ′ ⊢ ⊥ as a premise for some Γ′ free from ¬,⊥
so the indutive hypothesis sues. The same applies to Fix. No right rule
an introdue ⊥, so the last step is not a right rule. The same applies to
Zero,PrePost. No other rule exists.
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Theorem 6.11. (Consisteny)The logi is onsistent, i.e. ∅ 6⊢ ⊥.
Proof. Diret onsequene of Lemma 6.10.
Cut-free derivations enjoy the subformula property, stating that all the for-
mulae ourring suh a derivation for a sequent appear as subformulae in the
sequent as well. Equivalently, it states that a ut-free derivation of a sequent an
only involve subformulae of that sequent. As a single exeption, the derivation
might mention ⊥ while the sequent does not, beause of the weakR rule.
Denition 6.12. The subformulae sub(p) of a formula p are indutively dened
as follows
sub(p) = {p}
sub(⊥) = {⊥}
sub(⊤) = {⊤}
sub(¬p) = {¬p} ∪ sub(p)
sub(p ∨ q) = {p ∨ q} ∪ sub(p) ∪ sub(q)
sub(p ∧ q) = {p ∧ q} ∪ sub(p) ∪ sub(q)
sub(p→ q) = {p→ q} ∪ sub(p) ∪ sub(q)
sub(p։ q) = {p։ q} ∪ sub(p) ∪ sub(q)
The subformulae of a set of formulae Γ is sub(Γ) =
⋃
p∈Γ sub(p).
Lemma 6.13. (Subformula Property)If
D
Γ ⊢ p
and D is ut-free, then the
formulae ourring in D belong to sub(Γ, p,⊥).
Proof. By a simple indution on D. The property is preserved by every rule.
Note that a {cut,weakR}-free derivation would instead have a more tight
sub(Γ, p) bound.
We an now establish deidability for PCL.
Lemma 6.14. (Deidability)Γ ⊢ p is deidable.
Proof. We have Γ ⊢ p i it an be derived without cuts. We an deide the
latter by searhing for a shortest derivation bottom-up, exploring the whole
proof spae non-deterministially. By the subformula property, ut-free proofs
an only ontain sequents having formulae in sub(Γ, p,⊥). This is a nite set of
sequents: let k be its ardinality. The depth of the searh in the proof spae an
be limited to k: if there is a taller derivation, it has a sequent ourring twie
in some path, so the proof an be made shorter. This ensures the termination
of the algorithm.
We have implemented the above naïve deision proedure for PCL, develop-
ing a prototype tool, whih we used for experimenting with our logi. Sine the
proof spae is huge, the tool was very helpful in establishing the negative results
for our logi, i.e. 6⊢ p from some given p. We give more information about it in
Set. A.2.
We an now prove the non redundany of the ։-related rules.
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Lemma 6.15. None of the Zero, PrePost, Fix Gentzen rules is redundant.
Proof. First, we arefully examine the proof of the ut-elimination theorem,
and hek that the same proof atually establish ut-elimination event in the
rule system without any of the rules Zero, PrePost, Fix. This is beause the
ut-elimination proedure never introdues a new appliation of, say, a Fix rule
unless Fix was already present in the original derivation. Similarly, we an
restate the subformula property in these restrited rule systems, as well as de-
idability. We therefore have deision proedures for both the full rule system
and eah restrition of it, so we an hek that indeed some formula is provable
in the full system, but not in the restrition. As it might be expeted, it turns
out that to prove the Hilbert axioms Zero, PrePost, Fix in the Gentzen system,
the related rule is neessary. This was heked by a simple modiation of our
tool, desribed in Set. A.2.
As a nie result of the subformula property, we get that PCL is a onservative
extension of IPC.
Lemma 6.16. PCL is a onservative extension of IPC, that is ⊢IPC p ⇐⇒ ⊢ p
for all IPC formulae p.
Proof. The ⇒ part is Lemma 8.4. For the ⇐ part, if ⊢ p, by Lemma 6.2 we
have ⊢G p. By ut-elimination and the subformula property, we have
D
⊢ p
where
D make no use of rules Zero, Fix, and PrePost. Sine all the other rules are
inluded in the Gentzen system of IPC, we an state ⊢IPC p.
7 Cut-elimination
In this setion we prove ut elimination for the Gentzen system of Def. 6.1.
In order to do this, we borrow a fairly simple strutural indution tehnique
from [27℄.
2
The whole tehnique an be desribed as a reursive algorithm,
transforming a generi derivation into a ut-free one. The algorithm is made of
two reursive routines: a ore routine (ut-redue) and a driver (ut-elim).
The ore routine deals with the speial ase of a derivation ending with a cut
between two ut-free subderivations. We name derivations of this speial form
reduible derivations. When provided with a reduible derivation, ut-redue
produes a ut-free derivation for the same sequent. Exploiting ut-redue,
the driver ut-elim handles the general ase. The atual proedure is shown
in Alg. 1.
2
Here, strutural means that it proeeds indutively on the struture of a derivation in
the Gentzen system.
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Algorithm 1 Main driver for ut-elimination.
ut-elim
( D0
Γ0 ⊢ p0
D1
Γ1 ⊢ p1
Γ ⊢ p
cut
)
=ut-redue
( D′0
Γ0 ⊢ p0
D′1
Γ1 ⊢ p1
Γ ⊢ p
cut
)
ut-elim
( · · · Di
Γi ⊢ pi
· · ·
Γ ⊢ p
r
)
=
· · ·
D′i
Γi ⊢ pi
· · ·
Γ ⊢ p
r (r 6= cut)
where
D′i
Γi ⊢ pi
=ut-elim
( Di
Γi ⊢ pi
)
The ut-elim driver takes as input a derivation D. First, it applies itself
reursively on the derivations of the premises Di so onverting them to the ut-
free ones D′i. Then, if the last rule r used in D is not a cut, we an apply
the same rule to D′i to onstrut a ut-free derivation. Otherwise, r is a cut,
and we are in the speial ase handled by ut-redue, so we just invoke it.
The ut-elim driver always terminates sine eah reursive all is made on a
subderivation.
In the rest of this setion, we dene the ore routine ut-redue. This
routine makes use of a sophistiated reursion sheme. When invoked as
ut-redue
( D0
Γ ⊢ p
D1
Γ, p ⊢ q
Γ ⊢ q
cut
)
with ut-free D0, D1
the routine makes several reursive alls, all of them for reduible derivations.
Assume a reursive all is made on a ut having p′ as the ut formula, andD′0, D
′
1
as the subderivations. Then, one of the following onditions holds:
Denition 7.1. Constraints on the reursive alls to ut-redue:
3
1. p′ is a proper subformula of p, or
2. p′ = p and h(D′0) < h(D0), or
3. p′ = p, h(D′0) ≤ h(D0), and h(D
′
1) < h(D1).
We an state the onditions above as follows: the triple (p′, h(D′0), h(D
′
1)) is
lexiographially smaller than (p, h(D0), h(D1)). It is easy to see that this or-
dering for triples is a well-founded ordering relation, and therefore the reursion
must eventually terminate.
We now proeed to dene the ut-redue routine. This is done by ex-
amining the last rules used in D0 and D1, and overing all the possible ases.
To simplify the presentation, we adopt a ompat notation, writing =⇒ for our
redution, as seen in Alg. 2. The rest of this setion will preisely dene the
=⇒ relation.
3
We let onditions 2 and 3 to overlap, sine we use ≤ instead of =. This is done to follow
our atual redution proedure more losely, as we will see.
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Algorithm 2 Core routine for ut-elimination.
ut-redue
( D0
Γ ⊢ p
D1
Γ, p ⊢ q
Γ ⊢ q
cut
)
=D¯
where
D0
Γ ⊢ p
D1
Γ, p ⊢ q
Γ ⊢ q
cut =⇒ D'
and D¯ is obtained by reursively applying ut-redue to all the cuts in D′.
When we write D =⇒ D′, D is a reduible derivation, and D′ is the result of
the redution. When we use cuts in D′, they are to be interpreted as reursive
alls to the ut-redue routine. Of ourse, we shall take are these uts
agree with the well-founded ordering disussed above. We doument this in the
derivation D′, by writing cutp when we are in ase 1 of the enumeration above,
cut0 when we are in ase 2, or cut1 when we are in ase 3.
7.1 Summary of Cases
To lassify all possible ases, we rst introdue some terminology. Eah Gentzen
rule is related to some logial onnetive. A rule for a generi onnetive ⊙ has
as its prinipal formulae the formulae ourring in that rule that involve ⊙.
Rules id, weakR and cut have no prinipal formulae. Both left and right
rules in the IPC fragment have exatly one prinipal formula. Rules Zero and
Fix have one prinipal formula as well. When a prinipal formula ours in
the left (resp. right) hand side of the turnstile ⊢we all it a left (resp. right)
prinipal formula. Rule PrePost has two prinipal formulae, named left prinipal
and right prinipal formulae.
In order to redue:
D0
Γ ⊢ a
D1
Γ, a ⊢ b
Γ ⊢ b
cut
we proeed by ase analysis on the last rule used in D0, D1. The derivation
D0an end with a Zero rule, a PrePost rule, a Fix rule, or an IPC rule. Similarly
for D1. These 4
2
ases are further split, aording to whether
• the ut formula is the left prinipal formula of D0 and the right prinipal
formula of D1 (the essential ase),
• is not the right prinipal formula of D0 (the left ommutation ase), or
• is not the left prinipal formula of D1 (the right ommutation ase).
This lassiation is rather standard in ut-elimination results, and is used in
[27℄ as well. Note that the two ommutation ases an overlap when the ut
formula is not right/left prinipal in both D0, D1, respetively. In Table 1, we
over all the possible ases, and group them whenever the handling is similar.
We now provide a reading key for Table 1. The rst row desribes the ase
where D0 ends with Zero. In this ase, the ut formula is the right prinipal for-
mula of D0, and so there is no left ommutation ase, denoted by ∄(l). The rst
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D0\ D1 Zero PrePost Fix IPC
Zero
∄ (l)
∄ (e)
*/Zero (r)
Zero/PrePost (e)
*/PrePost (r)
Zero/Fix (e)
*/Fix (r)
∄ (e)
standard (r)
PrePost
∄ (l)
∄ (e)
*/Zero (r)
PrePost/PrePost (e)
*/PrePost (r)
PrePost/Fix (e)
*/Fix (r)
∄ (e)
standard (r)
Fix
∄ (e)
[Fix/* (l)℄
*/Zero (r)
Fix/* (l)
[*/PrePost (r)℄
Fix/* (l)
[*/Fix (r)℄
Fix/* (l)
[standard (r)℄
IPC
∄ (e)
[standard (l)℄
*/Zero (r)
∄ (e)
standard (l)
[*/PrePost (r)℄
∄ (e)
standard (l)
[*/Fix (r)℄
standard (e,l,r)
(e) essential, (l) left ommutation, (r) right ommutation, [subsumed℄
Table 1: Summary of ases for ut-elimination
ell is for the ase where D1 ends with Zero as well: this is a right ommutation
ase whih is handled in the same way as PrePost/Zero, Fix/Zero, et. so we
will have a single ase ∗/Zero ase for the whole olumn. The Zero/PrePost ase
an be an essential ase or a right ommutation depending on whether the ut
formula is the left prinipal formula of PrePost, so we split in two subases. The
right ommutation ase ∗/PrePost is also reused in other points in the same ol-
umn. The same applies to Zero/Fix. The Zero/IPC ase an not be an essential
ase, sine ։ never ours in an IPC rule; so this is a right ommutation.
The seond row desribes the ase whereD0 ends with PrePost, and is similar
to the rst row.
The third row desribes the ase where D0 ends with Fix. Sine Fix has
no right prinipal formula, there is no essential ase in this row, denoted by
∄(e). The ase Fix/Zero is both a left and right ommutation ase, whih we
arbitrarily hose to handle as a right ommutation ase. The remaining ases
might be right ommutations, but are surely left ommutations Fix/∗, so we
handle them in that way.
The fourth row desribes the ase where D0 ends with an IPC rule. The ase
IPC/Zero might be a left ommutation (depending on the atual IPC rule), but
is surely a right ommutation as well, so we handle it in that way. The ase
IPC/PrePost an not be an essential ase, sine ։ ours in no IPC rule; it
might be a right ommutation, but is surely a left ommutation (no IPC rules
involves։), so we handle it in that way. The ase IPC/Fix is similar. The ase
IPC/IPC an be either essential, a left ommutation, or a right ommutation.
We invite the reader to hek that Table 1 indeed enumerates all the possible
ases, whih an therefore be grouped as follows:
• essential: Zero/PrePost (e), Zero/Fix (e), PrePost/PrePost (e), PrePost/Fix
(e), standard (e)
• left ommutations: Fix/∗ (l), standard (l)
• right ommutations: ∗/Zero (r), ∗/PrePost (r), ∗/Fix (r), standard (r)
Most ases of the standard group are well-known ases for IPC, and are overed
in [27℄, Appendix 1. This inludes, for instane, the essential ase ∧R/∧L1, the
left ommutation ∧L1/∗, and the right ommutation ∗/ ∧ R. Handling these
ases here would essentially amount to opying the whole Appendix 1 of [27℄
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here, and perform some minor notation hange, only. Sine this would provide
no atual ontribution, we will refer to [27℄ when these ases arise, and omit
them. For ompleteness, we doument in Set. A.1 how to rephrase [27℄ in our
notation. Finally, reall that in Def. 6.1 we diverge from [27℄ in a few IPC rules,
namely ¬R and weakR. Of ourse, these rules are involved in standard ases
whih are not overed in [27℄, so we shall provide a redution for these ases.
The ase ¬R/∗ an not be a left ommutation, but it an be essential (¬R/¬L);
the ase ∗/¬R is instead a right ommutation. The ase ∗/weakR is a right
ommutation, while weakR/∗ is a left ommutation.
We now proeed by handling all the ases mentioned above. We sometimes
write Γ(p) instead of Γ to stress that p ∈ Γ.
7.2 The Essential Cases
In these ases the ut formula is (right/left) prinipal in both the premises of
the ut.
• Case Zero/PrePost
D0
Γ ⊢ q
Γ ⊢ p։ q
Zero
D1
Γ, p։ q, a ⊢ p
D2
Γ, p։ q, q ⊢ b
Γ, p։ q ⊢ a։ b
PrePost
Γ ⊢ a։ b
cut =⇒
D0
Γ ⊢ q
Γ, q ⊢ q
id
Γ, q ⊢ p։ q
Zero
D2
Γ, q, p։ q ⊢ b
Γ, q ⊢ b
cut1
Γ ⊢ b
cutp
Γ ⊢ a։ b
Zero
• Case Zero/Fix
D0
Γ ⊢ q
Γ ⊢ p։ q
Zero
D1
Γ, p։ q, a ⊢ p
D2
Γ, p։ q, q ⊢ a
Γ, p։ q ⊢ a
Fix
Γ ⊢ a
cut =⇒
D0
Γ ⊢ q
Γ, q ⊢ q
id
Γ, q ⊢ p։ q
Zero
D2
Γ, q, p։ q ⊢ a
Γ, q ⊢ a
cut1
Γ ⊢ a
cutp
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• Case PrePost/PrePost. We an assume (p։ q) ∈ Γ.
D0
Γ, a ⊢ p
D1
Γ, q ⊢ b
Γ ⊢ a։ b
PrePost
D2
Γ, a։ b, x ⊢ a
D3
Γ, a։ b, b ⊢ y
Γ, a։ b ⊢ x։ y
PrePost
Γ(p։ q) ⊢ x։ y
cut =⇒
Dˆ0
Γ, x ⊢ p
Dˆ1
Γ, q ⊢ y
Γ(p։ q) ⊢ r
PrePost
Dˆ0 =
D0+
Γ, x, a ⊢ p
D1+
Γ, x, q ⊢ b
Γ, x ⊢ a։ b
PrePost
D2
Γ, x, a։ b ⊢ a
Γ, x ⊢ a
cut1
D0+
Γ, x, a ⊢ p
Γ, x ⊢ p
cutp
Dˆ1 =
D1
Γ, q ⊢ b
D0+
Γ, q, b, a ⊢ p
D1+
Γ, q, b, q ⊢ b
Γ, q, b ⊢ a։ b
PrePost
D3+
Γ, q, b, a։ b ⊢ y
Γ, q, b ⊢ y
cut1
Γ, q ⊢ y
cutp
• Case PrePost/Fix. We an assume (p։ q) ∈ Γ.
D0
Γ, a ⊢ p
D1
Γ, q ⊢ b
Γ ⊢ a։ b
PrePost
D2
Γ, a։ b, r ⊢ a
D3
Γ, a։ b, b ⊢ r
Γ, a։ b ⊢ r
Fix
Γ(p։ q) ⊢ r
cut =⇒
Dˆ0
Γ, r ⊢ p
Dˆ1
Γ, q ⊢ r
Γ ⊢ r
Fix
Dˆ0 =
D0+
Γ, r, a ⊢ p
D1+
Γ, r, q ⊢ b
Γ, r ⊢ a։ b
PrePost
D2
Γ, r, a։ b ⊢ a
Γ, r ⊢ a
cut1
D0+
Γ, r, a ⊢ p
Γ, r ⊢ p
cutp
Dˆ1 =
D1
Γ, q ⊢ b
D0+
Γ, q, b, a ⊢ p
D1+
Γ, q, b, q ⊢ b
Γ, q, b ⊢ a։ b
PrePost
D3+
Γ, q, b, a։ b ⊢ r
Γ, q, b ⊢ r
cut1
Γ, q ⊢ r
cutp
• standard. As antiipated, we refer to [27℄ here, but for the ase ¬R/¬L,
shown below.
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• Case ¬R/¬L
D0
Γ, p ⊢ ⊥
Γ ⊢ ¬p
¬R
D1
Γ,¬p ⊢ p
Γ,¬p ⊢ q
¬L
Γ ⊢ q
cut =⇒
D0
Γ, p ⊢ ⊥
Γ ⊢ ¬p
¬R
D1
Γ,¬p ⊢ p
Γ ⊢ p
cut1
D0
Γ, p ⊢ ⊥
Γ ⊢ ⊥
cutp
Γ ⊢ q
weakR
7.3 The Left Commutation Cases
In these ases the ut formula is not a right prinipal formula in the left premise
of the ut.
• Case Fix/∗.We an assume (p։ q) ∈ Γ.
D0
Γ, a ⊢ p
D1
Γ, q ⊢ a
Γ ⊢ a
Fix
D2
Γ, a ⊢ b
∗
Γ(p։ q) ⊢ b
cut =⇒
Γ, b, p ⊢ p
id
D1+
Γ, b, q ⊢ a
D0+
Γ, b, q, a ⊢ p
Γ, b, q ⊢ p
cut0
Γ, b ⊢ p
Fix
D1
Γ, q ⊢ a
D2+
Γ, q, a ⊢ b
Γ, q ⊢ b
cut0
Γ ⊢ b
Fix
• standard. As antiipated, we refer to [27℄ here, but for the ase weakR/∗,
shown below.
• Case weakR/∗
D0
Γ ⊢ ⊥
Γ ⊢ p
weakR
D1
Γ, p ⊢ q
∗
Γ ⊢ q
cut =⇒
D0
Γ ⊢ ⊥
Γ ⊢ q
weakR
7.4 The Right Commutation Cases
In these ases the ut formula is not a left prinipal formula in the right premise
of the ut.
• Case ∗/Zero
D0
Γ ⊢ a
∗
D1
Γ, a ⊢ q
Γ, a ⊢ p։ q
Zero
Γ ⊢ p։ q
cut =⇒
D0
Γ ⊢ a
D1
Γ, a ⊢ q
Γ ⊢ q
cut1
Γ ⊢ p։ q
Zero
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• Case ∗/PrePost. We an assume (p։ q) ∈ Γ.
D0
Γ ⊢ a
∗
D1
Γ, a, x ⊢ p
D2
Γ, a, q ⊢ y
Γ, a ⊢ x։ y
PrePost
Γ(p։ q) ⊢ x։ y
cut =⇒
D0+
Γ, x ⊢ a
D1
Γ, x, a ⊢ p
Γ, x ⊢ p
cut1
D0+
Γ, q ⊢ a
D2
Γ, q, a ⊢ y
Γ, q ⊢ y
cut1
Γ ⊢ x։ y
PrePost
• Case ∗/Fix. We an assume (p։ q) ∈ Γ.
D0
Γ ⊢ a
∗
D1
Γ, a, r ⊢ p
D2
Γ, a, q ⊢ r
Γ, a ⊢ r
Fix
Γ(p։ q) ⊢ r
cut =⇒
D0+
Γ, r ⊢ a
D1
Γ, r, a ⊢ p
Γ, r ⊢ p
cut1
D0+
Γ, q ⊢ a
D2
Γ, q, a ⊢ r
Γ, q ⊢ r
cut1
Γ ⊢ r
Fix
• standard. As antiipated, we refer to [27℄ here, but for the ases ∗/weakR
and ∗/¬R, shown below.
• Case ∗/weakR
D0
Γ ⊢ p
∗
D1
Γ, p ⊢ ⊥
Γ, p ⊢ q
weakR
Γ ⊢ q
cut =⇒
D0
Γ ⊢ p
D1
Γ, p ⊢ ⊥
Γ ⊢ ⊥
cut1
Γ ⊢ q
weakR
• Case ∗/¬R
D0
Γ ⊢ p
D1
Γ, p, q ⊢ ⊥
Γ, p ⊢ ¬q
¬R
Γ ⊢ ¬q
cut =⇒
D0+
Γ, q ⊢ p
D1
Γ, q, p ⊢ ⊥
Γ, q ⊢ ⊥
cut1
Γ ⊢ ¬q
¬R
8 Relations with Other Logis
In this setion we explore the relationships between PCL and other logis. We
are interested in possible mappings, to see if there is some way to enode PCL
in some other pre-existing logi. For instane, sine PCL is a diret extension of
IPC, one might wonder whether the newly introdued onnetive for ontratual
impliation ։ an be expressed using IPC onnetives. We answer negatively
to this question in Set. 8.1. In Set. 8.2 we explore some mappings to the
modal logi S4, by extending a well-known mapping from IPC to S4.
In this setion, when we need to prove tautologies of IPC or S4, we will
sometimes resort to an automati theorem prover. To this purpose, we use the
Logis WorkBenh (LWB) [22℄. The interested reader will nd in Set. A.3 how
to obtain the atual proofs generated by LWB.
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8.1 Mappings to IPC
As shown by Lemma 4.8, the priniple of exluded middle trivializes ontratual
impliation. This supports for the use of IPC, rather then e.g. CPC and S4, as
the basis for our logi. We study here the mappings that at homomorphially
with respet to eah IPC onnetive.
Denition 8.1. A homomorphi mapping (from PCL to IPC) is a funtion
m(•) suh that:
m(p) = p (p prime)
m(p ∧ q) = m(p) ∧m(q)
m(p ∨ q) = m(p) ∨m(q)
m(p→ q) = m(p)→ m(q)
m(¬p) = ¬m(p)
m(⊤) = ⊤
m(⊥) = ⊥
A homomorphi mapping m(•) is omplete if and only if ⊢ p implies ⊢IPC m(p),
and it is sound if and only if ⊢IPC m(p) implies ⊢ p. Note that m(p ։ q) is
not onstrained by the above denition.
We rst state some basi properties of homomorphi mappings.
Lemma 8.2. Let m(•) be a homomorphi mapping. Then:
m(p↔ q) = m(p)↔ m(q)
Proof. Trivial expansion of the syntati sugar for ↔.
Lemma 8.3. For all homomorphi mappings m(•) and for all IPC formulae p,
we have m(p) = p.
Proof. Trivial strutural indution.
The identity is a sound and omplete partial mapping for IPC formulae.
Lemma 8.4. ⊢IPC p =⇒ ⊢ p.
Proof. Trivial, sine the Hilbert axioms of PCL inlude those of IPC.
We antiipate here a result whih will be formally proved in Set. 6, namely
the partial ompleteness of the identity mapping. Note that this atually makes
PCL a onservative extension of IPC.
Lemma 8.5. For all IPC formulae p, we have ⊢ p =⇒ ⊢IPC p.
Proof. See Lemma 6.16.
We are aware of several omplete but unsound mappings from PCL to IPC.
Among these, two are peuliar, in that they provide the strongest and weakest
interpretations of the onnetive։ in IPC. The formal justiation for this
terminology will be lear after Lemma 8.11.
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Denition 8.6. The strongest interpretation of ։ in IPC, alled s(•), is
dened as the homomorphi mapping suh that:
s(p։ q) = s(q)
We now prove the ompleteness of s, as well as its unsoundness.
Lemma 8.7. For all PCL formulae p, we have that ⊢ p =⇒ ⊢IPC s(p). The
onverse is false, in general.
Proof. Easy indution on the derivation of ⊢ p.
• If ⊢ p was derived through an IPC axiom, then we use the same axiom to
derive ⊢IPC s(p), sine s is an homomorphism.
• If ⊢ p was derived through a ։ axiom, we have the following subases.
 Zero: p = ⊤։ ⊤. Trivially, ⊢IPC s(p) = ⊤.
 Fix: p = (r ։ r)→ r. Trivially, ⊢IPC s(p) = s(r)→ s(r).
 PrePost: p = (r′ → r)→ (r ։ q)→ (q → q′)→ (r′ ։ q′). Then,
⊢IPC s(p) = (s(r
′)→ s(r))→ s(q)→ (s(q)→ s(q′))→ s(q′)
is easy. Indeed, if we generalize the above by replaing s(r), s(r′), s(q), s(q′)
with distint prime formulae, the formula still holds, as it an be triv-
ially veried either by hand or through an IPC theorem prover. We
used LWB for this: see Set. A.3 for more details.
• If ⊢ p was derived through a ut
p p→ q
q
, then by indutive hypothesis
we have ⊢IPC s(p) and ⊢IPC s(p→ q), the latter being ⊢IPC s(p)→ s(q).
We an then onlude by the ut
s(p) s(p)→ s(q)
s(q)
.
The onverse does not hold in general, e.g. for p = (r ։ q)→ q.
Below, we introdue the weakest interpretation w for ontratual implia-
tion. This is somehow dual with respet to s, as we will see in Lemma 8.10.
Denition 8.8. The weakest interpretation of ։ in IPC, alled w(•), is
dened as the homomorphi mapping suh that:
w(p։ q) = (w(q)→ w(p))→ w(q)
We now prove the ompleteness of w, as well as its unsoundness.
Lemma 8.9. For all PCL formulae p, we have that ⊢ p =⇒ ⊢IPC w(p). The
onverse is false, in general.
Proof. Easy indution on the derivation of ⊢ p.
• If ⊢ p was derived through an IPC axiom, then we use the same axiom to
derive ⊢IPC w(p), sine w is an homomorphism.
• If ⊢ p was derived through a ։ axiom, we have the following subases.
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 Zero: p = ⊤։ ⊤. Trivially, ⊢IPC w(p) = (⊤ → ⊤)→ ⊤.
 Fix: p = (r ։ r) → r. Then, ⊢IPC w(p) = ((w(r) → w(r)) →
w(r)) → w(r) is simple to prove.
 PrePost: p = (r′ → r)→ (r ։ q)→ (q → q′)→ (r′ ։ q′). Then,
⊢IPC w(p) = (w(r
′)→ w(r))→ ((w(q)→ w(r)) → w(q))→ A
where A = (w(q)→ w(q′))→ ((w(q′)→ w(r′))→ w(q′))
an be proved in IPC. Indeed, if we generalize the above by replaing
w(r), w(r′), w(q), w(q′) with distint prime formulae, the formula still
holds, as it an be trivially veried by an IPC theorem prover. We
used LWB for this: see Set. A.3 for more details.
• If ⊢ p was derived through a ut
p p→ q
q
, then by indutive hypothesis we
have ⊢IPC w(p) and ⊢IPC w(p→ q), the latter being ⊢IPC w(p)→ w(q).
We an then onlude by the ut
w(p) w(p)→ w(q)
w(q)
.
The onverse does not hold in general, e.g. for p = ((q → r)→ q)→ (r ։ q).
Below, we relate the mappings s and w, by examining their behaviour on
p ։ q, where p, q are IPC formulae. In Lemma 4.7 we proved that these
mappings give suient and neessary onditions for p։ q, i.e.:
⊢ s(p։ q)→ (p։ q) (31)
⊢ (p։ q)→ w(p։ q) (32)
We now establish that s and w are, respetively, the weakest suient on-
dition and the strongest neessary ondition for p։ q that an be expressed in
IPC. Note that Lemma 8.10 below does not apply when p, q ontain ontratual
impliations.
Lemma 8.10. Let p, q be IPC formulae. That is,
1. If for an IPC formula c we have ⊢ c→ (p։ q), then ⊢ c→ q.
2. If for an IPC formula c we have ⊢ (p։ q)→ c, then ⊢ ((q → p)→ q)→ c.
Proof. For (1), by Lemma 8.7, we have ⊢IPC s(c → (p ։ q)). That is ⊢IPC
s(c)→ s(q), hene by Lemma 8.3 ⊢IPC c→ q. We onlude by Lemma 8.4.
For (2), by Lemma 8.9, we have ⊢IPC w((p ։ q) → c). That is ⊢IPC
((w(q) → w(p)) → w(q)) → w(c), hene by Lemma 8.3 ⊢IPC ((q → p)→ q)→
c. We onlude by Lemma 8.4.
Here we justify the terms strongest and weakest for s and w.
Lemma 8.11. Letm ≤ n be the preorder over omplete homomorphi mappings
m,n given by
⊢IPC n(p։ q)→ m(p։ q) for all IPC formulas p, q
Then, s(•) is a maximum and w(•) is a minimum. That is, w ≤ m ≤ s for
any omplete m.
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Proof. For s, we need to show that ⊢IPC s(p։ q)→ m(p։ q). By Lemma 8.3,
m(s(p ։ q)) = s(p ։ q), so we need to show ⊢IPC m(s(p ։ q)) → m(p ։ q),
whih is ⊢IPC m(s(p ։ q)→ (p ։ q)). By ompleteness, it is enough to show
⊢ s(p։ q)→ (p։ q), whih is (31).
Similarly, for w we need to show that ⊢IPC m(p ։ q) → w(p ։ q). By
Lemma 8.3, m(w(p ։ q)) = w(p ։ q), so we need to show ⊢IPC m(p ։ q) →
m(w(p ։ q)), whih is ⊢IPC m((p ։ q) → w(p ։ q)). By ompleteness, it is
enough to show ⊢ (p։ q)→ w(p։ q), whih is (32).
We proved that s and w are omplete homomorphi mappings. Several
others do exist, however. Below, we provide a short table of those known to us
at the time of writing.
m(p։ q) = m(q) (s)
m(p։ q) = (m(q)→ m(p))→ m(q) (w)
m(p։ q) = ¬¬(m(q)→ m(p))→ m(q)
m(p։ q) = ¬(m(q)→ m(p)) ∨m(q)
m(p։ q) = ((m(q)→ m(p)) ∨ a)→ m(q) for any prime a
The ompleteness proofs for these mappings are similar to those of Lemma
8.7 and 8.9, so we omit them. However no mapping an be sound, as we show
below.
Theorem 8.12. There is no sound homomorphi mapping from PCL to IPC.
Proof. By ontradition, suppose there exists an homomorphi mapping m(•)
suh that ⊢IPC m(p) =⇒ ⊢ p for all p. Take p = m(q։ r)↔ (q։ r) for some
prime q, r. Then m(p) = m(m(q ։ r)) ↔ m(q ։ r) = m(q ։ r) ↔ m(q ։ r)
by Lemma 8.2. The last form is trivially provable in IPC, so we an state
⊢IPC m(p). By the soundness of m(•), we have ⊢ p. Hene
⊢ m(q։ r)→ (q։ r)
⊢ (q։ r)→ m(q։ r)
By Lemma 8.10, we have
⊢ m(q։ r)→ r
⊢ ((r → q)→ r)→ m(q։ r)
hene, ⊢ ((r → q) → r) → r. By Lemma 8.5 we have ⊢IPC ((r → q) → r) → r.
This is however false, sine IPC an not prove Peire's law (not even on prime
formulae).
8.2 Mappings to S4
We shall onsider the extensions of a standard IPC mapping to S4 [20, 17℄.
Denition 8.13. An extended mapping to S4 is a funtion m(•) from PCL to
S4 suh that
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m(p) = p
m(p ∧ q) = m(p) ∧m(q)
m(p ∨ q) = m(p) ∨m(q)
m(p→ q) = (m(p)→ m(q))
m(⊤) = ⊤
m(⊥) = ⊥
m(¬p) = ¬m(p)
m(p։ q) = C[m(p),m(q)]
for some xed S4 formula ontext C.
We now introdue some tehnial lemmas.
Denition 8.14. A formula p is -invariant i ⊢S4 p↔ p.
Note that the ← diretion is atually true for all p.
Lemma 8.15. If p, q are -invariant, thenm(p∧q),m(p∨q),m(p→ q),m(¬p),m(⊤),m(⊥),m(a)
(with a prime) are suh.
Proof. The ases ⊤,⊥ are trivial. For the others, we proeed as follows. For
∧, we simply apply ⊢S4 a ∧ b → (a ∧ b). Similarly, for ∨, we apply ⊢S4
a ∨b→ (a ∨ b). For ¬,→, a, we apply ⊢S4 a→ a.
Lemma 8.16. Assume that, for all -invariant p, q, m(p։ q) is -invariant.
Then, for any p, m(p) is -invariant.
Proof. By strutural indution on p. Indeed, all the indutive steps are overed
by either the hypothesis or Lemma 8.15.
Lemma 8.17. If a is prime, m(q) is -invariant, and ⊢S4 m(p), then we have
⊢S4 m(p{q/a}).
Proof. Clearly, m(p) = C[m(a)] = C[a] for some ontext C. So, for the same
ontext,m(p{q/a}) = C[m(q)]. Sinem(q) is-invariant, the latter is equivalent
in S4 to C[m(q)] = C[a]{m(q)/a} = m(p){m(q)/a}. The last formula holds
in S4, by substituting a in ⊢S4 m(p).
We are aware of several omplete but unsound mappings to S4.
Denition 8.18. The extended mappings e1, . . . , e4 to S4 are dened as follows:
e1(p։ q) = (e1(q)→ e1(p))→ e1(q)
e2(p։ q) = ♦(♦e2(q)→ e2(p))→ e2(q)
e3(p։ q) = ((e3(q)→ e3(p))→ e3(q))
e4(p։ q) = ((e4(q)→ ♦e4(p))→ e4(q))
Lemma 8.19. ei(p) is -invariant.
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Proof. By Lemma 8.16, we only need to hek that ei(p ։ q) is -invariant
whenever p, q are suh. If we write Ci for the ontexts suh that ei(p ։ q) =
Ci[ei(p), ei(q)], then it is suient to verify that
⊢S4 (a↔ a) ∧ (b↔ b)→ (Ci[a, b]↔ Ci[a,b]) (33)
and then onlude by substituting the prime formulae a, b. Formula (33), for
eah i, an be easily veried. A simple way to do it is to use a S4 theorem
prover. We used LWB for this: see Set. A.3 for more details.
Lemma 8.20. ⊢S4 ei(p։ q)↔ ej(p։ q) i i = j .
Proof. This is an easy, albeit long, exerise. See Set. A.3 for more details.
Lemma 8.21. The mappings ei(•) are omplete, i.e.⊢ p =⇒ ⊢S4 ei(p), for
i ∈ [1..4]. The onverse is false, in general, so they are unsound.
Proof. We proeed by indution on the derivation of ⊢ p.
If p is an instane of a PCL axiom, by Lemma 8.16 and 8.17 it is suient to
onsider the ase of the axiom being applied to prime distint formulae, sine
we an then substitute them to obtain p. Therefore, we hek whether ⊢ ei(q)
for eah prime instane of eah PCL axiom q. This generates a nite number
of spei formulae to verify in S4. Sine this is rather long, we resort to LWB
for this task. See Set. A.3 for more details.
If instead ⊢ p was derived through a ut rule, say
a a→ p
p
, then, by the
indutive hypothesis, we have ⊢S4 m(a) and ⊢S4 m(a→ p) = (m(a)→ m(p)).
Sine q → q is a tautology of S4, we an have ⊢S4 m(a) → m(p). By the ut
rule of S4, we onlude ⊢S4 m(p).
For the unsoundness result, it is enough to hek that ⊢S4 ei(pi) for some pi
suh that 6⊢ pi. This was heked using the LWB theorem prover: we refer to
Set. A.3 for more details.
8.3 Lax PCL
Propositional lax logi (PLL) [15℄ is an extension of IPC with a single modality
#, alled lax modality, haraterized by the following axioms:
p→ #p #R
# # p→ #p #M
(p→ q)→ (#p→ #q) #F
These axioms appear to be relevant for ontrats. Suppose we have a on-
trat at hand, and reason about its impliations. If we read #p as p is ensured
by the ontrat, then the axioms agree with our intuition. Axiom #R states
that true propositions are always guaranteed. Axiom #M states that ommit-
ting to a promise is atually a promise itself. Axiom #F is simple: if p is ensured,
and implies q, learly q must be ensured as well.
One might expet that, if we take a xed formula c expressing the require-
ments of a ontrat, and we interpret #q as c։ q, then this should satisfy the
axioms above. In other words, we expet # = c ։ • to be a lax modality (for
any xed c). However, it turns out that this is not the ase in PCL.
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Lemma 8.22. PCL proves #R and #F, but not #M.
Proof. Under the above denition of #, Axiom #R holds, as one an derive it
using PrePost and Zero. Axiom #F is also a speial ase of PrePost. Axiom #M
does not hold, that is 6⊢ (c։ (c ։ p))→ (c ։ p): this an be veried through
the deision proedure of Lemma 6.14.
Quite interestingly, sometimes PLL is axiomatized in an alternative equiva-
lent way. Instead of inluding #F as an axiom, a related inferene rule is used,
together with another axiom:
p→ q
#p→ #q
#F
(#q ∧#r)→ #(q ∧ r) #S
Axiom #S does not hold either in PCL under our interpretation for #. We
atually already stated this when we disussed property (21). We will not use
this alternative axiomatization, sine it uses another inferene rule, and we nd
this inonvenient.
We now disuss how to extend PCL so that the indexed modality #p, dened
as #pq = p ։ q, is a lax modality. We need to adapt both our Hilbert-
style axiomatization and our sequent alulus rules. For the Hilbert-style proof
system, we simply augment the axioms of Def. 4.2 with the #M axiom, following
Lemma 8.22. We all PCL
Lax
the logi extended as suh.
Denition 8.23. The Hilbert-style axiomatisation of PCL
Lax
extends that of
PCL (Def. 4.2) with the following axiom:
(p։ (p։ q))→ (p։ q) Lax
In this setion we redene ⊢ to stand for provability in PCLLax.
We now adapt the sequent alulus of Def. 6.1.
Denition 8.24. The sequent alulus for PCL
Lax
extends that of PCL (Def. 6.1)
with the rule:
Γ, p։ q, a ⊢ p Γ, p։ q, q ⊢ a։ b
Γ, p։ q ⊢ a։ b
Lax
The above rule is best understood when ompared with PrePost:
Γ, p։ q, a ⊢ p Γ, p։ q, q ⊢ b
Γ, p։ q ⊢ a։ b
PrePost
The single dierene between PrePost and Lax is the use of b instead of a։ b
in the seond premise. Indeed, beause of this, rule Lax is more general, in that
it subsumes rule PrePost.
Lemma 8.25. The PrePost rule is redundant in the PCLLax sequent alulus.
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Proof. Indeed, we an replae eah use of PrePost in a derivation using Lax as
follows:
D0
Γ, p։ q, a ⊢ p
D1
Γ, p։ q, q ⊢ b
Γ, p։ q ⊢ a։ b
PrePost =⇒
D0
Γ, p։ q, a ⊢ p
D1
Γ, p։ q, q ⊢ b
Γ, p։ q, q ⊢ a։ b
Zero
Γ, p։ q ⊢ a։ b
Lax
Consequently, we will neglet rule PrePost from now on. We an now restate
a number of fundamental results, starting from the Hilbert-Gentzen equivalene.
Theorem 8.26. ⊢H p ⇐⇒ ⊢G p
Proof. We adapt the proof of Th.6.4. To prove ⊢H p =⇒ ⊢G p, we just need to
derive the Lax axiom in the sequent alulus.
p։ (p։ q), p ⊢ p
id
p։ (p։ q), p։ q ⊢ p։ q
id
p։ (p։ q) ⊢ p։ q
Lax
⊢ (p։ (p։ q))→ (p։ q)
→ R
For the other diretion, ⊢G p =⇒ ⊢H p, we provide the missing ase:
• Rule Lax: [(
∧
Γ ∧ (p։ q) ∧ a)→ p] ∧ [(
∧
Γ ∧ (p։ q) ∧ q)→ (a։ b)] →
(
∧
Γ ∧ (p։ q))→ (a։ b).
Assume all the hypotheses. We get Γ, p ։ q, hene a → p, q → (a ։ b).
By PrePost, we get p ։ (a ։ b). Again by PrePost, we get a։ (a ։ b).
We apply Lax to onlude a։ b.
Lemma 8.27. The Lax rule is not redundant.
Proof. Otherwise, the PrePost rule would be redundant in plain PCL, so we
onlude by Lemma 6.15 and Lemma 8.25.
Theorem 8.28. (Cut-elimination) The cut rule is redundant in PCLLax.
Proof. We proeed as in Set.7, replaing the PrePost rule with the Lax one.
Cases not involving PrePost are thus unaeted. Aording to Table 1, we need
to hek four new ases: three essential (Zero/Lax, Lax/Lax, Lax/Fix), and one
right ommutation (*/Lax). We now dene the redution relation =⇒ for these
ases.
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• Case Zero/Lax (essential)
D0
Γ ⊢ q
Γ ⊢ p։ q
Zero
D1
Γ, p։ q, a ⊢ p
D2
Γ, p։ q, q ⊢ a։ b
Γ, p։ q ⊢ a։ b
Lax
Γ ⊢ a։ b
cut =⇒
D0
Γ ⊢ q
Γ, q ⊢ q
id
Γ, q ⊢ p։ q
Zero
D2
Γ, p։ q, q ⊢ a։ b
Γ, q ⊢ a։ b
cut1
Γ ⊢ a։ b
cutp
• Case Lax/Lax (essential)
D0
Γ, p0 ⊢ p
D1
Γ, q ⊢ p0։ q0
Γ ⊢ p0։ q0
Lax
D2
∆, a0 ⊢ p0
D3
∆, q0 ⊢ a0։ b0
∆ = Γ, p0։ q0 ⊢ a0։ b0
Lax
Γ(p։ q) ⊢ a0։ b0
cut =⇒
Da Db
Γ(p։ q) ⊢ a0։ b0
Lax
Da =
D0+
Γ, a0, p0 ⊢ p
D1+
Γ, a0, q ⊢ p0։ q0
Γ, a0 ⊢ p0։ q0
Lax
D2+
Γ, a0, p0։ q0 ⊢ p0
Γ, a0 ⊢ p0
cut1
D0+
Γ, a0, p0 ⊢ p
Γ, a0 ⊢ p
cutp
Db =
D1
Γ, q ⊢ p0։ q0
D2+
Γ, q, p0։ q0, a0 ⊢ p0
D3+
Γ, q, p0։ q0, q0 ⊢ a0։ b0
Γ, q, p0։ q0 ⊢ a0։ b0
Lax
Γ, q ⊢ a0։ b0
cut0
• Case Lax/Fix (essential)
D0
Γ, p0 ⊢ p
D1
Γ, q ⊢ p0։ q0
Γ ⊢ p0։ q0
Lax
D2
Γ, r, p0։ q0 ⊢ p0
D3
Γ, q0, p0։ q0 ⊢ r
Γ, p0։ q0 ⊢ r
Fix
Γ(p։ q) ⊢ r
cut =⇒
Da Db
Γ(p։ q) ⊢ r
Fix
Da =
Γ, r, p ⊢ p
id
D1+
Γ, r, q ⊢ p0։ q0
D2+
Γ, r, q, p0։ q0 ⊢ p0
Γ, r, q ⊢ p0
cut0
D0+
Γ, r, q, p0 ⊢ p
Γ, r, q ⊢ p
cutp
Γ, r ⊢ p
Fix
Db =
D1
Γ, q ⊢ p0։ q0
D2+
Γ, q, p0։ q0, r ⊢ p0
D3+
Γ, q, p0։ q0, q0 ⊢ r
Γ, q, p0։ q0 ⊢ r
Fix
Γ, q ⊢ r
cut0
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• Case */Lax (right ommutation)
D0
Γ ⊢ r
D1
Γ, r, a ⊢ p
D2
Γ, r, q ⊢ a։ b
Γ, r ⊢ a։ b
Lax
Γ(p։ q) ⊢ a։ b
cut =⇒
D0+
Γ, a ⊢ r
D1
Γ, a, r ⊢ p
Γ, a ⊢ p
cut1
D0+
Γ, q ⊢ r
D2
Γ, r, q ⊢ a։ b
Γ, q ⊢ a։ b
cut1
Γ(p։ q) ⊢ a։ b
Lax
Of ourse, we are able to restate deidability.
Lemma 8.29. The sequent alulus of PCL
Lax
satises the subformula prop-
erty.
Proof. Trivial inspetion of the rule Lax.
Theorem 8.30. (Deidability) The logi PCL
Lax
is deidable.
Proof. Immediate by Lemma 8.29 and Th.8.28. See Th.6.14 for more details.
9 Prinipals
As illustrated by the examples in Set. 5, PCL allows for inferring whether some
promise is implied by a set of ontrats. In real-world senarios, eah ontrat
will be issued by a given prinipal. It would then be useful to represent the
binding between prinipals and ontrats within the logi. This would allow,
for instane, to single out the prinipal who is responsible for a violation, and
possibly take ountermeasures against him.
To this aim, we extend our logi with a says modality, similarly to [17℄.
Denition 9.1. The syntax of PCL
says
extends that of PCL (Def. 4.1) as
follows:
p ::= · · · | A says p
where we assume a set of (atomi) prinipals, ranged over by A,B, . . ..
We an then rephrase Alie's ontrat from the toy exhange example in
Set. 1 as Alice says (b։ a). This represents the fat that the prinipal named
Alie has issued a ontrat, where she promises to lend her airplane, provided
that she borrows a bike.
We now develop the proof theory of PCL
says
. Essentially, we extend the
PCL axioms with those of the logi ICL [17℄. This is an indexed lax logi,
where the lax modality orresponds to our says . The interesting ontribution
is that this extension preserves all the main results of PCL, in partiular its
deidability.
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Denition 9.2. The Hilbert-style axiomatisation of PCL
says
extends that of
PCL (Def. 4.2) with the following axioms:
p→ (A says p) SaysR
(A says A says p)→ A says p SaysM
(p→ q)→ (A says p)→ (A says q) SaysF
Bak to our toy exhange example of Set. 1, one would expet to dedue
an agreement between Alie and Bob, that ommits Alie to lend her airplane
(i.e., Alice says a), and ommits Bob to lend his bike (i.e., Bob says b). A
areful speiation of the kids ontrats is however needed, in order to obtain
the expeted result. As a rst attempt, onsider the following speiation:
ptoy = Alice says (b։ a) ∧ Bob says (a։ b)
While, at rst sight, this speiation seems enough to dedue the desired result,
it turns out that a dierent (and quite weaker) handshaking is reahed, i.e.:
ptoy → Alice says Bob says (a ∧ b)
That is, Alie and Bob together promise to exhange their toys. However,
this only tells half of the story: atually, it does not distinguish the duties of
Alie from those of Bob. Atually, the onditions required by Alie and Bob
(respetively, b and a) do not preisely apture our intuition. In the ontrat
Alice says (b ։ a), a promise of b from Bob is not enough to ommit Alie to
lend her airplane: requiring b means that Alie wants indeed to have the bike.
As a result, in the speiation ptoy we an dedue that a and b hold only under
the responsibility of both Alie and Bob.
The speiation an be made more preise as follows. Alie promises to
lend her airplane, provided that Bob promises to lend his bike (and vie versa).
The overall ontrat an then be rephrased as:
p′toy = Alice says ((Bob says b)։ a) ∧ Bob says ((Alice says a)։ b)
The new ontrat reveals the whole story, that is, the duty of Alie is that of
lending her airplane, and the duty of Bob is that of lending his bike.
p′toy → Alice says a ∧ Bob says b
The above obligations an be exploited by a third party (a sort of au-
tomated judge) whih has to investigate the responsibilities of the involved
parties, in the unfortunate ase that the ontrat is not respeted. For instane,
if our judge is given the evidene that Alie's airplane has never been lent to
Bob, then he will be able to infer that Alie has not respeted her ontrat (and
possibly punish her), that is:
p′toy ∧ ¬a → (Alice says a ∧ ¬a) → Alice says ⊥
Expliitly representing prinipals has some additional benets, espeially
when putting our logi at work in inseure environments populated by attakers.
Atually, an attaker ould maliiously issue a fake ontrat, where he makes a
promise that he annot atually implement, e.g. beause the promised duty an
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only be performed by another party. By binding eah ontrat with its prinipal,
it is easy to realize when someone has attempted suh a fraud, beause the
prinipal who has signed the ontrat is dierent from who is due to implement
the promised behaviour.
Bak to our tehnial development, the main results of PCL are also enjoyed
by its extension PCL
says
.
Denition 9.3. The sequent allus of PCL
says
inludes all the rules for PCL,
and the following additional rules:
Γ ⊢ p
Γ ⊢ A says p
SaysR
Γ, A says p, p ⊢ A says q
Γ, A says p ⊢ A says q
SaysL
Theorem 9.4. (Cut Elimination) If p is provable in PCLsays , then there
exists a proof of p whih does not use the Cut rule.
Proof. We use the strutural approah of [27℄, similarly to Set. 7. The ases
involving only PCL rules have been already dealt with in Set. 7. The ases
involving only says are dealt with in [17℄. The other ases are ommutations,
and so they are dealt with either as in Set. 7 or as in [17℄.
Lemma 9.5. The sequent alulus of PCL
says
satises the subformula property.
Proof. Trivial inspetion of rules SaysR and SaysL.
Theorem 9.6. (Deidability) The logi PCL
says
is deidable.
Proof. Diret from Th.9.4 and Lemma 9.5.
10 Related Work
Various approahes to the problem of providing both lients and servies with
provable guarantees about eah other's funtional behaviour have been studied
over the last few years. Yet, at the present no widespread tehnology seems to
give a general solution to this problem.
The motivations underlying our ontrat logi seem somewhat related to
those for the logis introdued in [3℄ to study how to ompose assume-guarantee
speiations of onurrent systems [2℄. The idea is that a system will give
some guarantee M1 about its behaviour, provided that also the environment it
operates within will behave aording to some assumption M2, and vie versa.
This is rendered in [3℄ as the intuitionisti formula (M1 →M2) ∧ (M2 →M1).
However, the tehnial development of the two approahes is quite dierent. In
our approah, we use ontratual impliation ։, rather than impliation →, in
order to obtain M1 ∧M2 from (M1 ։ M2) ∧ (M2 ։ M1). In [3℄, instead, the
onnetive → is the usual impliation of intuitionisti logi. Therefore, simply
adding the axiom (M1 → M2) ∧ (M2 → M1) ⊢ M1 ∧ M2 would make the
logi inonsistent. To overome this problem, in [3℄ the above judgement only
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holds in partiular models, whih are subjet to several onstraints (e.g., the
propositionsM1,M2 must be interpreted as safety properties). While this allows
for exploring these models at some depth, our approah appears more general,
sine it develops a proof theory of ontrats while abstrating from the spei
models of the logi.
The omplexity of real-world senarios, where several onepts like prini-
pals, ontrats, authorizations, duties, delegation, mandates, regulations, et.
are inextriably intermingled, have led to a steady ourishing of new logis over
the years. The logis proposed to model suh senarios take inspiration and
extend e.g. lassial [12℄, modal [11℄, deonti [28, 18℄, default [19℄ and defeasible
logis [21℄. We think none of these logis, inluding our PCL, aptures all the
faets of ontrats. Eah of these logis is designed to represent some partiular
aspet of ontrats, e.g. obligations, permissions and prohibitions in deonti log-
is, violation of ontrats in default and defeasible logis, and agreement in our
ontrat logi. We argue that, sine these aspets are orthogonal, it is possible
to extend PCL with features from some of these logis.
Our researh seems also related to foundational researh on authorization
logis for distributed systems [1, 17, 23℄. There, the problem is that of deid-
ing whether, given a bunh of authorization assertions modelled in the logi
(possibly involving omplex onepts like roles, groups, delegations), we an
dedue that a prinipal has the right to aess a given resoure. While many
of these onepts are ommon with ontrats, there is a fundamental dierene
between the two worlds. While authorizations logis are foussed on deiding if
a prinipal is allowed to perform some ation, in our ontrat logi we are also
onerned with disovering what that prinipal has to promise in return.
Reent researh papers address the problem of dening ontrats that speify
the interation patterns among (lients and) servies [8, 9, 25℄. For instane,
in [9℄ a ontrat is a proess in a proess algebra featuring only prexing, internal
and external hoie. A lient ontrat is ompliant with a servie ontrat if
any possible interation between the lient and the servie will always sueed.
There, a main problem is how to dene (and deide) a subontrat relation,
that allows for safely substituting servies without aeting the ompliane with
their lients. Even assuming that servies are trusted and respet the published
ontrat, this approah provides the lient with no provable guarantees, exept
that the interation with the servie will sueed, that is all the expeted
synhronizations will take plae. For instane, onsider a simple buyer-seller
senario. In our vision, it is important to provide the buyer with the guarantee
that, e.g., after the payment has been made, then either the payed goods are
made available, or a full refund is issued. For the seller, it is important to be
sure that, e.g., a buyer will not repudiate a ompleted transation, so to obtain
for free the goods already delivered. This ould be modelled by the following
ontrats, assuming a perfet duality between buyer and seller:
Buyer = (ship ∨ refund)։ pay Seller = pay։ (ship ∨ refund)
The above two ontrats lead to an agreement, whih allows the buyer for pay-
ing, and the seller for shipping or issuing a refund. Instead, in [9℄ the ontrats
of the buyer and of the seller would take a very dierent form, e.g.:
Buyer = pay. (ship+ refund) Seller = pay. (ship⊕ refund)
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Intuitively, this means that the lient will rst output a payment, and then
either reeive the item, or reeive a refund (at servie disretion). Dually, the
servie will rst input a payment, and then opt for shipping the item or issuing
a refund. However, this is very distant from our notion of ontrats.
First, suh ontrats are quite rigid, in that they preisely x the order in
whih the ations must be performed. Even though in some ases this may be
desirable, many real-world ontrats seem to allow for a more liberal way of
onstraining the involved parties (e.g., I will pay before the deadline).
Seond, while the ruial notion if the ontrats in [9℄ is ompatibility, in our
model we fous on the inferring the obligations that arise from a set of ontrats.
The key dierene between the two notions is that, given a set of ontrats, a
ompatibility hek results in a yes/no output, while inferring the obligations
provides a ne-grained quantiation of the reahed agreement. For instane,
the obligations may identify who is responsible of eah ation mentioned in the
ontrat. We an then exploit this information to take some reovery ation
against lients and servies whih do not respet their promises.
A lot of work addresses the problem of managing servie failures in long-
running business transations, see e.g. [10, 5, 7, 6℄. Sine, in a long-lived trans-
ation, the standard rollbak mehanism of database systems does not sale, the
idea is to partition the long transation into a sequene of smaller transations,
eah of whih is assoiated with a given ompensation [16℄. Compensations are
reovery ations speied by the servie designer, that will be run upon failures
of the standard exeution. For instane, we an model our buyer-seller senario
as follows in Compensating CSP [7℄. The seller harges the buyer redit ard,
and then proeeds by shipping the ordered item. Simultaneously, the seller
performs an availability hek, to see whether the ordered item is in stok. If
the item is not available, the servie throws an exeption, whih triggers the
ompensation refundAmount. This ompensation restores the original state of
the buyer aount, so it will atually perform a transation rollbak:
Seller = [ availCheck; (ok;SKIPP  notOk;THROWW )
|| (debitAmount÷ refundAmount) ]; ship
Notie that the hoie of the ompensation is ruial; while refundAmount may
be aeptable by any lient, if the ompensation was instead just a 15%Discount
on the next order, then not all the lients would have been perfetly happy.
Atually, our main ritiism to long-running transations is that lients have
absolutely no ontrol on the ompensations provided by servies.
In our vision, instead, lients have the right to selet those servies that oer
the desired ompensations. For instane, we may exploit our logi to model the
ontrat of a buyer that will pay provided that, if the ordered item is unavailable,
then she will obtain a full refund, as well as a 15% disount on the next order:
Buyer =
(
unavailable→ (refund ∧ 15%discount)
)
։ pay
11 Conlusions and Future Work
We have investigated the notion of ontrat from a logial perspetive. To do
that, we have extended intuitionisti propositional logi with a new onnetive,
that models ontratual impliation. We have provided the new onnetive with
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an Hilbert-style axiomatisation, whih have allowed us to dedue, for instane,
that n ontrating parties, eah requiring a promise from the other n−1 parties
in order to make its own promise, eventually reah an agreement. Further
interesting properties and appliation senarios for our logi have been explored,
in partiular in Set. 3 and 5.
The main result about our logi is its deidability. To prove that, we have
devised a Gentzen-style sequent alulus for the logi, whih is equivalent to
the Hilbert-style axiomatisation. Deidability then follows from the subformula
property, whih is enjoyed by our Gentzen rules, and by a ut elimination theo-
rem, whih we have proved in full details in this paper. As a further support to
our logi, we have implemented a proof searh algorithm, whih deides if any
given formula is a tautology or not.
Our logi for ontrats has served as a basi building blok for designing a
alulus of ontrating proesses [4℄. This is an extension of Conurrent Con-
straints, featuring a peuliar mehanism for the fusion of variables, whih well
suites to formalise ontrat agreements. Our alulus is expressive enough to
model a variety of typial senarios, and to enode some ommon idioms for
onurreny, among whih the pi-alulus and graph rewriting.
11.1 Future Work
While designing the logi for ontrats proposed in this paper, our main on-
erns were to give a minimal set of rules for apturing the notion of ontrat
agreement, and at the same time preserving the deidability of IPC.
We expet that many useful features an be added to our logi, to make
it suitable for modelling omplex senarios, whih are not diretly manageable
with the basi primitives presented here. Of ourse, preserving the deidability
of the logi will be a major onern, while onsidering these extensions. We
disuss below some of the additional features whih we think to be more useful
in the future developments of our logi.
First order features. A signiant extension to our logi would be that of
extending it with prediates and quantiers. This will allow us to model more
aurately several senarios, where a party issues a generi ontrat that an
be mathed by many parties. While this rst order extension shall fore us to
drop the deidability result, we expet to nd interesting deidable fragments
of the logi, through whih modelling many relevant situations.
For instane, onsider an e-ommere senario, where a seller promises to
ship the purhased item to a given address, provided that the ustomer will
pay for that item. Aiming at generality, we make the seller ontrat parametri
with respet to the item, ustomer and address. This ould be modelled using
a universal quantiation over these three formal parameters:
Seller = ∀item, customer , address :
pay(item, customer , address)։ ship(item, address)
(34)
Now, assume that a ustomer (say, Bob) promises that he will pay for a drill,
provided that the seller will ship the item to his address. This is modelled by
the following ontrat issued by Bob, where the atual parameters remark that
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the atual payment is made by Bob, and that the destination address is Bob's.
Bob = ship(drill, bobAddress)։ pay(drill,Bob, bobAddress)
Joining the two two ontrats above will yield the intended agreement, that is:
Seller ∧ Bob → pay(drill,Bob, bobAddress) ∧ ship(drill, bobAddress)
Consider now an attaker wanting to maliiously exploit the seller ontrat,
in order to reeive a free item, and to make the unaware ustomer Bob pay for
it. To do that, the attaker issues the following ontrat:
FakeBob = ship(10Kdiamond, fakeAddress)
։ pay(10Kdiamond,Bob, fakeAddress)
Joining the seller and the attaker ontrats will then ause an unwelome sit-
uation for Bob, who is due to pay for a 10K diamond, whih will be shipped to
the attaker's address:
Seller ∧ FakeBob →
pay(10Kdiamond,Bob, fakeAddress) ∧
ship(10Kdiamond, fakeAddress)
To ope with this situation, we ould require that eah ontrat p is signed by
the prinipal A who issues it, i.e. it has the form A says p. Revisiting our
example with this trik, in the safe ase that Bob himself has ordered the item,
we would expet to dedue:
Seller ∧ Bob → Bob says pay(drill,Bob, bobAddress)
In this ase, we have a suessful transation, beause Bob is stating that he will
pay for his drill. Instead, joining the seller and the attaker ontrats produes:
Seller ∧ FakeBob →
FakeBob says pay(10Kdiamond,Bob, fakeAddress)
Now, it is easy to realize that someone has attempted a fraud, beause the
prinipal who has signed the ontrat (FakeBob) is dierent from that who is
due to pay (Bob).
Expliit time. Time is another useful feature that may arise while modelling
real-world senarios. For instane, in an e-ommere transation, a ontrat
may state that if the ustomer returns the purhased item within 10 days from
the purhase date, then she will have a full refund within 21 days from then.
We would like to model suh a ontrat in a temporal extension of our logi,
so to reason about the obligations that arise when the deadlines expire. Bak
to our e-ommere example, we ould imagine to express the seller's ontrat
as the following formula, where the parameter t in p(t) tells the point in time
where the event p ours:
Seller (t) : ∀t′ : (pay(t) ∧ return(t′) ∧ t′ < t+10)։ ∃t′′ < t′+21 : refund(t′′)
From the point of view of the buyer, the ontrat says that the buyer is willing
to pay, provided that she an obtain a full refund (within 21 days from the
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date of payment), whenever she returns the item within 7 days from the date
of payment:
Buyer (t) : ∀t′ : (return(t′) ∧ t′ < t+10→ ∃t′′ < t′+21 : refund(t′′))։ pay(t)
We expet our extended logi able to dedue that, in the presene of an
agreement (i.e. a ompleted e-ommere transation) between the ustomer and
the seller on (say) January the 1st, 2009, if the ustomer has returned the
purhased item on January the 5th, then the seller is required to issue a full
refund to the ustomer within January, the 26th. This ould be modelled by
the formula:
Buyer(1.1.09) ∧ Seller(1.1.09) ∧ return(5.1.09)→ refund(26.1.09)
There are a number of tehniques aimed at the expliit representation of
time in logial systems, so we expet to be able to reuse some of them for
extending PCL. These tehniques range from Temporal Logi [14℄, to more
reent approahes on temporal extensions of authorization logis like [13℄.
Proess aluli and ontrats. In this paper we have foussed our attention
on logis-based formalisms for modelling ontrats, and for deiding when they
lead to an agreement among the involved parties. However, our investigation
on ontrats is still at its beginnings, and in future work we plan to study, along
with logis for ontrats, programming languages that exploit their features. As
a rst attempt towards this diretion, we have designed in [4℄ a ore alulus
for ontrat-based omputing.
In the future, we will ontinue to develop proess aluli for ontrats, in
partiular to desribe the behaviour of proesses in the presene of attakers.
All the extensions we shall onsider will have to preserve some haraterizing
features, e.g. the ability of publishing and stipulating ontrats, that of deiding
whether a given formula is on duty, and that of taking reovery ations in the
ase a ontrat is not respeted.
We plan to develop analysis tehniques to formally and automatially prove
the orretness of the servie infrastruture, e.g. that the ontrats are always
respeted, without the need for resorting to third parties (e.g. legal oes)
external to the model.
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A Appendix
A.1 Adapting Pfenning's Notation
For ompleteness, we show here how to adapt the notation of [27℄, Appendix 1,
to ours. As an example, we adapt the essential ase ∧R/ ∧ L1. All the other
ases are similarly dealt with. In [27℄ we nd the redution
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N
Γ→A1
N3
Γ→A2
Γ→ (A1 ∧A2)
∧R ⊗
N4
Γ,(A1∧A2),A1→A
Γ, (A1 ∧A2)→ A
∧ L1⇒
N2
Γ→ A
N
Γ,A1→A1
N3
Γ,A1→A2
Γ, A1 → (A1 ∧A2)
∧R ⊗
N4
Γ, (A1 ∧A2), A1 → A
⇒
N1
Γ, A1 → A
N
Γ→ A1
⊗
N1
Γ, A1 → A
⇒
N2
Γ→ A
whih we an read as follows. The sign ⊗ in the rst line is the reduible
ut, the sign → is our ⊢, while N,N3, N4 are the subderivations from whih
we want to onstrut N2. This is done in the next lines. First, a reursive all
is made in the seond line using N,N3, N4 in order to obtain N1. Note that
the rightmost derivation w.r.t. ⊗ is smaller now. Then, N1 is used in another
reursive all in the third line, together with N , to onstrut N2. Here instead
the ut formula A1 is smaller than (A1 ∧A2).
In our notation, we rephrase the above as:
N
Γ ⊢ A1
N3
Γ ⊢ A2
Γ ⊢ A1 ∧A2
∧R
N4
Γ, A1 ∧A2, A1 ⊢ A
Γ, A1 ∧A2 ⊢ A
∧ L1
Γ ⊢ A
cut =⇒
N
Γ ⊢ A1
N+
Γ, A1 ⊢ A1
N3+
Γ, A1 ⊢ A2
Γ, A1 ⊢ A1 ∧A2
∧R
N4
Γ, A1, A1 ∧A2 ⊢ A
Γ, A1 ⊢ A
cut1
Γ ⊢ A
cutp
A.2 The PCL Tool
To experiment with our logi, we developed a theorem prover for PCL. To
prove (or refute) a formula p, it tries to onstrut a derivation of ∅ ⊢ p using
the rules of the sequent alulus. The derivation is onstruted in a bottom-up
fashion, through an exhaustive searh of the proof spae. We avoid potential
loops (e.g. repeating weakL forever) by pruning the branhes whih would lead
to a derivation having a double ourrene of the same sequent in a root-to-leaf
path. In other words, we look for minimal proofs. Lemma 6.14 ensures this is a
sound and omplete proedure to hek for validity in PCL. When a derivation
is found, it is provided as output. When the whole proof spae is exhausted
unsuessfully, a no derivation message is printed.
This simple proof-searh tehnique is ineient in the worst ase. Indeed,
PCL is a onservative extension of IPC (Lemma 6.16), so the problem is no
easier than heking validity in IPC, whih is known to be PSPACE-hard [29℄.
In all our examples, however, we were able to apply the tool, whih required
only a few seonds to omplete. In our experiments, a depth-rst proof searh
performed worse than a depth-rst searh, so we adopted the latter in our tool.
The urrent prototype onsists of about 600 lines of Haskell soure ode.
The tool is made available as free software from [26℄.
Below we show a simple session with the PCL tool:
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> Pl '(((a ->> b) /\ (b ->> a)) -> (a /\ b))'
Formula: (((a ->> b) /\ (b ->> a)) -> (a /\ b))
Result
> Pl '(((p ->> q) /\ (p ->> r)) -> (p ->> (q /\ r)))'
Formula: (((p ->> q) /\ (p ->> r)) -> (p ->> (q /\ r)))
NoResult
> # High verbosity prints searh progress and LaTeX derivation
> Pl --verbosity=4 '((p ->> q) -> ((q -> p) -> q))'
Formula: ((p ->> q) -> ((q -> p) -> q))
1
2
3
4
5
Result (LaTeX follows):
\dfra{\dfra{\dfra{\dfra{\dfra{}{q, (q \imp p), (p \oimp q) \vdash q} id...
The last derivation renders as
q, (q → p), (p։ q) ⊢ q
id
p, q, (q → p), (p։ q) ⊢ p
id
q, (q → p), (p։ q) ⊢ p
→ L
q, (q → p), (p։ q) ⊢ q
id
(q → p), (p։ q) ⊢ q
F ix
(p։ q) ⊢ ((q → p)→ q)
→ R
⊢ ((p։ q)→ ((q → p)→ q))
→ R
A.2.1 Auxiliary Results for PCL
Here is the input le we used to prove the negative results in the paper with
our PCL tool.
#!/bin/sh
Pl '((p -> q) -> (p ->> q))'
Pl '((p -> q) -> ((q -> r) -> (p ->> r)))'
Pl '((p ->> (q \/ r)) -> ((p ->> q) \/ (p ->> r)))'
Pl '(((p ->> q) /\ (p ->> r)) -> (p ->> (q /\ r)))'
Pl '(( ->> ( ->> p)) -> ( ->> p))'
A.3 Formal Proofs in LWB
Sometimes in our proofs we rely on a theorem prover for heking IPC or S4
tautologies. To this purpose we used the Logis WorkBenh tool (LWB) [22℄.
We provide here the soure ode we used to perform these heks. The output of
the tool, whih inludes the long, detailed, formal proofs is also available online
[26℄.
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A.3.1 Auxiliary Results in IPC
# For proof generation, unomment this.
# generateDetailedProof :== true;
load(ip);
if generateDetailedProof then set("infolevel", 4);
# Debug.
pro: trae(x)
begin
#print(x);
return x;
end;
# translate a formula
pro: transl(A, phi)
begin
if (phi[0℄ = AND) then
return (transl(A, phi[1℄) & transl(A, phi[2℄));
if (phi[0℄ = OR) then
return (transl(A, phi[1℄) | transl(A, phi[2℄));
if (phi[0℄ = IMP) then
return (transl(A, phi[1℄) -> transl(A, phi[2℄));
if (phi[0℄ = EQ) then
return transl(A, (phi[1℄ -> phi[2℄) & (phi[2℄ -> phi[1℄) );
if (phi[0℄ = SYMBOL) then
return phi;
if (phi[0℄ = imp) then
begin
loal a, b;
a := transl(A, phi[1℄);
b := transl(A, phi[2℄);
return A{a/p}{b/q};
end;
print("ERROR transl!!!!");
print(phi[0℄);
return phi[0℄;
end;
# Test whether A is sound
pro: test(A)
begin
# axioms: Zero, Fix, PrePost
if not provable(trae(transl(A, imp(true,true)))) then
return false;
if not provable(trae(transl(A, imp(p,p) -> p))) then
return false;
if not provable(transl(A, (p1 -> p) -> imp(p,q) -> (q -> q1) -> imp(p1,q1)))
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then return false;
return true;
end;
#########################################################
# Known mappings
interp :==
[ q
, (q->p) -> q
, ((q->p) v r) -> q
, ~~(q->p) -> q
, ~(q->p) v q
℄ ;
sound :== true;
foreah A in interp do begin
print("Proving soundness for ",A);
if not test(A) then begin
print("unsound: ", A);
sound :== false;
end;
end;
if sound then
print("#### All mappings are sound.");
print("Proving independene");
interp2 :== interp;
indep := true;
while not (interp2 = [℄) do begin
A :== pop(interp2);
foreah B in interp2 do
if provable(transl(A, imp(p,q)) <-> transl(B, imp(p,q))) then begin
indep :== false;
print("NOT independent: ", A, " AND ", B);
end;
end;
if indep then
print("#### All mappings are independent.");
quit;
A.3.2 Auxiliary Results in S4
#
# Searh for all the sound S4 mappings of ontratual impliations
# of the form
# qs[1℄ ( qs[2℄ ( qs[3℄ q -> qs[4℄ p ) -> qs[5℄ q )
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# where qs are modalities among identity, box, and diamond.
# The mapping is an extension of the standard IPC-to-S4 mapping.
#
# For proof generation, unomment this.
# generateDetailedProof :== true;
load(s4);
if generateDetailedProof then set("infolevel", 4);
# apply a modality q (one of i,b,d) to a formula
pro: appMod(q, phi)
begin
if q = i then return phi;
if q = b then return box phi;
if q = d then return dia phi;
print("ERROR appMod");
print(q);
end;
# translate a imp using the modalities in qs
pro: translCoimpl(qs,p,q)
begin
return appMod(qs[1℄,
( appMod(qs[2℄, (appMod(qs[3℄, q) -> appMod(qs[4℄, p)))
->
appMod(qs[5℄, q)
));
end;
# translate a formula using the modalities in qs
pro: transl(qs, phi)
begin
if (phi[0℄ = AND) then
return (transl(qs, phi[1℄) & transl(qs, phi[2℄));
if (phi[0℄ = OR) then
return (transl(qs, phi[1℄) or transl(qs, phi[2℄));
if (phi[0℄ = IMP) then
return box (transl(qs, phi[1℄) -> transl(qs, phi[2℄));
if (phi[0℄ = EQ) then
return transl(qs, (phi[1℄ -> phi[2℄) & (phi[2℄ -> phi[1℄) );
if (phi[0℄ = NOT) then
return box ~ transl(qs, phi[1℄);
if (phi[0℄ = SYMBOL) then
return box phi;
if (phi[0℄ = imp) then
begin
loal p, q;
p := transl(qs, phi[1℄);
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q := transl(qs, phi[2℄);
return translCoimpl(qs,p,q);
end;
print("ERROR transl!!!!");
print(phi[0℄);
return phi[0℄;
end;
# Test whether the modalities qs give rise to a sound imp
pro: test(qs)
begin
# axioms: Zero, Fix, PrePost
if not provable(transl(qs, imp(true,true))) then
return false;
if not provable(transl(qs, imp(p,p) -> p)) then
return false;
if not provable(transl(qs, (p1 -> p) -> imp(p,q) -> (q -> q1) -> imp(p1,q1)))
then return false;
return true;
end;
###########################################
# main loop
mods :== [ i , b , d ℄ ; # modalities: identity, box, dia
sound :== 0 ;
tot :== 0 ;
sol :== [℄;
foreah q0 in mods do
foreah q1 in mods do
foreah q2 in mods do
foreah q3 in mods do
foreah q4 in mods do
begin
loal x;
x :== [q0,q1,q2,q3,q4℄;
tot :== tot + 1;
if test(x) then
begin
sound :== sound + 1;
sol :== onat(sol,[x℄);
end;
end;
print("Total formulas: ", tot);
print("Sound formulas: ", num);
#print(sol);
# remove redundant solutions (quotient up to <->)
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sol2 :== [℄;
foreah s in sol do
begin
found :== false;
foreah s2 in sol2 do
if provable(transl(s,imp(p,q)) <-> transl(s2,imp(p,q))) then
found :== true;
if not found then
sol2 :== onat(sol2, [s℄);
end;
print("Sound formulas up to <->: ", nops(sol2));
print(sol2);
foreah s in sol2 do
print(transl(s, imp(p,q)));
print("Completeness hek");
foreah s in sol2 do begin
omplete :== true;
# we try several formulas that are not PCL theorems
if provable(transl(s, imp(a,b) <-> b )) then # 1
omplete :== false;
if provable(transl(s, imp(a,b) <-> (~(b->a) or b) )) then # 2
omplete :== false;
if provable(transl(s, imp(a,b) <-> ((b->a)->b) )) then # 3
omplete :== false;
if provable(transl(s, imp(a,b) <-> (~~(b->a)->b) )) then # 4
omplete :== false;
if not omplete then
print("Formula ", s, " is not omplete.");
else
print("Formula ", s, " MIGHT be omplete.");
end;
quit;
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